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A THEORY OF CIVIL PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURTS
JESSICA K. STEINBERG *
This Article is the first to develop a problem-solving theory for the civil
justice system. Drug courts pioneered the problem-solving model in the
1990s to pursue therapeutic goals as an alternative to “assembly line” jailbased sentencing. This Article explores the potential for migration of the
drug court framework into the two most commonly adjudicated private law
cases: rental housing and consumer debt.
Three structural conditions in the civil courts—systemic lack of
counsel, high-volume dockets, and corporate capture of the small claims
process—routinely position vulnerable classes of individuals on the losing
end of litigation. In the aggregate, these conditions have rendered the civil
justice system predictably ineffective in combatting recurring social issues
such as substandard housing and unscrupulous debt collection. The heart of
the problem-solving theory in drug courts is the availability of an alternative
remedy: treatment over prison. In civil courts, the remedy itself is not
necessarily deficient; it is access to the remedy that is compromised. Relying
on two years of field research in an experimental court, this Article
demonstrates how core drug court principles, such as naming the purpose of
the court as solving a social problem, interdisciplinary collaboration, and a
strong judicial role, can be manipulated to address process failures in the
civil justice system and reimagine the courts as proactive institutions
responsible for the pursuit of socially beneficial outcomes.
The Article also argues that a civil problem-solving theory survives
many of the valid critiques levied against drug courts. In particular, drug
courts have come under fire for playing a moralizing role and using
compulsory treatment as a form of social control. A civil problem-solving
court, however, would not exacerbate the negative impact of state power on
already over-burdened groups. Instead, the targets of monitoring and
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behavior modification are the more powerful private actors to the litigation,
such as property owners and debt buyers, who otherwise have been known
to manipulate the courts—an instrument of the state—to evade their legal
obligations and suppress individual rights.
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INTRODUCTION

In the 1990s, judges dissatisfied with the mass processing of criminal
cases launched the problem-solving movement following the introduction of
the first drug court. 1 The drug court model is now firmly embedded within
the criminal justice system and has spawned a range of problem-solving
courts serving low-level offenders in areas such as mental health, veteran’s
affairs, and community reentry for formerly incarcerated citizens. 2 This
Article explores the potential for migration of the drug court framework into
the civil arena. It demonstrates that, with certain adaptations, the drug court
philosophy may be an effective tool in bringing the judicial system to bear
on some of the unique structural injustices that pervade private law cases and
have impaired the civil courts’ ability to disrupt recurring social problems.
A civil problem-solving model may also sidestep many of the legitimate
critiques that have plagued drug courts and provide a forum for much-needed
innovation in the role of the civil judge.
Drug courts are grounded in principles of therapeutic jurisprudence, a
theory centered on the consequences of a legal decision or the relationship
of the law to social effects. 3 Typically, a defendant charged with a low-level
drug offense is diverted away from the conventional court process, where
punishment is the focus, and instead opts into an alternative process where
treatment is the focus. 4
Every drug court is unique and adapted to the population it serves, but
the model embraces a number of common principles. The first is that the
court names its primary purpose as addressing the underlying social problem
of drug use that is seen as a contributory factor in recidivism. 5 A second
common principle is the interdisciplinary team approach. 6 Outside experts,
treatment providers, and service providers often work together with the judge
to develop goals and implement a drug treatment regimen. Last, drug courts
1 Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal
Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1605 (2012).
2 DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, CAROLYN D. HARDIN & CARSON L. FOX, NAT’L DRUG COURT
INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 7, 9 (2016).
3 See Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma & John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice
System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 446 (1999)
(contrasting therapeutic jurisprudence with “traditional” jurisprudence, which is insensitive to the
consequences of a decision).
4 See McLeod, supra note 1, at 1605–07 (describing the origins and common characteristics
of drug courts).
5 See Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer, 23 LAW &
POL’Y 125, 131 (2001).
6 MARLOWE, HARDIN & FOX, supra note 2, at 11, 28, 66.
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are outcome driven, rather than focused on formal procedures. Judges
closely monitor cases with regular hearings and often employ a system of
graduated sanctions and rewards to promote compliance. 7 The problemsolving approach pioneered by drug courts is intended to address root causes
of crime in ways that “assembly line” adjudication has failed to do. 8
Notably, outside of family law matters, the problem-solving model has
barely cracked the civil sphere. Traditional adjudication retains a nearexclusive grip on the resolution of private law disputes despite the fact that,
much like the criminal courts, the civil courts contend with a range of
intractable social problems that are often left unsolved by conventional
processes. 9
To take one example, tenants have long struggled to challenge
substandard housing conditions in the courts. 10 Landlords prosecute claims
for unpaid rent with ease, but tenants are rarely successful in enforcing their
corollary rights to habitable living conditions. In a second example, fraud
and abuse in consumer debt matters run rampant in the civil courts. 11 Debt
buyers aggressively pursue collection on debt that is of unknown origin, is
barred by time limitations, or has already been discharged through
bankruptcy or other means. 12 Even where the law should ostensibly protect
their assets, consumers are often subject to judgments that destroy their credit
and result in garnishment of their wages and bank accounts.
This Article contends that a set of structural forces unique to the civil
courts renders traditional adjudication predictably ineffective in resolving
certain recurring social problems. Relying on substandard housing and
consumer protection as two prominent illustrations, this Article examines
three systemic issues that undermine the courts’ ability to address significant
social issues. First, the civil courts are now beset by an unrepresented
majority. While criminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to counsel,
civil parties are not, and publicly funded attorneys are increasingly scarce.
7

Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 131–32.
Cf. id. at 130 (quoting Patrick McGrath, a deputy district attorney, as expressing
dissatisfaction with the “assembly line” approach to adjudication).
9 See infra Part II.
10 See, e.g., PUB. JUSTICE CTR., JUSTICE DIVERTED: HOW RENTERS ARE PROCESSED IN THE
BALTIMORE CITY RENT COURT 14-23 (2015); David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied
Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 389, 406–07 (2011).
11 See LISA STIFLER & LESLIE PARRISH, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, DEBT
COLLECTION AND DEBT BUYING: THE STATE OF LENDING IN AMERICA AND ITS IMPACT ON U.S.
HOUSEHOLDS 8–14 (2014).
12 See Mary Spector, Debts, Defaults, and Details: Exploring the Impact of Debt Collection
Litigation on Consumers and Courts, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 257, 263–73 (2011) (providing an
overview of the consumer debt collection industry and its history).
8
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As an aggravating condition, lopsided representation, in which one party has
counsel and the other does not, is increasingly common. Tenants and
consumers, for example, are typically represented by counsel in less than ten
percent of matters, while property owners and debt collectors have counsel
in up to ninety percent of cases. 13 Unrepresented parties struggle immensely
with issues of procedure and legal relevance, and often cannot compete with
their represented counterparts in developing the evidence necessary to
vindicate meritorious claims. With consistently low representation rates
among defined classes of litigants, the civil courts become unreliable forums
for the enforcement of particular rights.
Second, the explosion of high-volume dockets in the civil courts
parallels the crush of cases in the criminal courts, and perhaps is even a more
pressing problem. Partly as a result of high caseloads, most civil litigants
never see a judge or have any genuine access to an adjudicatory process. In
housing cases, for example, default judgments resolve up to fifty or sixty
percent of matters, subjecting tenants to forcible eviction and substantial
damages without any consideration of valid defenses such as the poor
condition of the rental unit. 14 In addition, most tenants who “litigate” their
claims are directed to the hallway of the courthouse to sign a perfunctory
settlement with their landlord’s attorney, typically without any judicial
oversight or exchange of evidence.15 Furthermore, the courts are ill-equipped
to handle even the volume of cases that survive both default judgment and
unbalanced settlement negotiations. A number of researchers have
documented trials that last less than five minutes, 16 as well as crowded
dockets in which one hundred housing matters are heard by a single court in
a single day. 17
Last, small claims courts within the civil justice system have been
captured by powerful corporations, undermining the promise of a flexible
procedural regime to protect the rights of ordinary litigants. 18 Small claims
judges have broad powers to elicit facts and interrogate the authenticity of
13 Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L. REV.
741, 750 (2015).
14 See infra Part II.
15 See infra Part II.
16 See LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., NO TIME FOR JUSTICE: A STUDY OF CHICAGO’S
EVICTION COURT 11–12 (2003) (finding that the average time per case was one minute and fortyfour seconds); THE WILLIAM E. MORRIS INST. FOR JUSTICE, INJUSTICE IN NO TIME: THE
EXPERIENCE OF TENANTS IN MARICOPA COUNTY JUSTICE COURTS 9 (2005) (stating that the
typical court would dispose of thirty to sixty eviction cases in sixty minutes or less).
17 Jessica K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An Empirical Look at a
Problem-Solving Housing Court, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1058, 1065 (2017) (up to 100 cases a
day are docketed on the District of Columbia’s landlord-tenant calendar). Similar conditions plague
consumer matters. See BRIAN STAUFFER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RUBBER STAMP JUSTICE: US
COURTS, DEBT BUYING CORPORATIONS, AND THE POOR 3–4 (2016).
18 See infra Part II.
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claims, but only rarely exercise that power. 19 In the debt context, for
example, the deep-seated adversarial tradition of a passive judge, coupled
with the procedural informality of the small claims system, has laid the
groundwork for debt collectors to perpetrate consumer fraud with impunity.
One common tactic is “sewer service,” a practice in which the debt collector
intentionally fails to serve the consumer with court papers, but then asserts
to the court that service has been perfected in order to secure an uncontested
default judgment. 20 A second is “robo-signing,” a practice in which the debt
collector attests to facts about an underlying debt in an affidavit without any
verification of the veracity of the claims. 21 Judges, trained by adversary
culture to “referee” rather than examine, rarely question the legitimacy of
such practices, even in informal courts that may permit such intervention.
This Article argues that the structural failings of traditional civil
adjudication invite consideration of drug court principles. At its best, the
drug courts’ problem-solving philosophy reimagines the courts as proactive
institutions responsible for the pursuit of socially beneficial outcomes. This
Article argues that implementation of a problem-solving framework, in
certain appropriate circumstances, may position the civil courts to more
effectively address a series of social problems that arise repeatedly in the
private law arena.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the conditions that
gave rise to the drug court movement in the criminal courts and describes the
key characteristics of the problem-solving model. Using the lens of the two
most commonly adjudicated civil issues—rental housing and consumer
debt—Part II then reveals different, but analogous, conditions in the civil
courts that may justify importation of problem-solving principles into private
law matters.
Part III develops a theory for adapting drug court methods to the civil
arena. In criminal courts, the heart of the problem-solving model is the
availability of an alternative remedy: treatment over prison. In civil courts,
the remedy itself is not necessarily deficient; indeed, housing codes and
consumer protection laws are already, in many ways, quite robust. Instead,
it is access to available remedies that is lacking. A civil problem-solving
court must therefore exploit the drug court philosophy to address process
failure and achieve three goals: (1) motivate judges to protect vulnerable

19

See infra Part II.
See Lisa Stifler, Debt in the Courts: The Scourge of Abusive Debt Collection Litigation and
Possible Policy Solutions, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 107 (2017) (defining “sewer service”).
21 See id. at 104–05 (defining “robo-signing”).
20
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court users; (2) attack information asymmetry; and (3) monitor liable parties
to induce performance. Relying on extensive field work in an experimental
housing court in the District of Columbia, this Part demonstrates how core
problem-solving principles—a named intent to solve a social problem,
interdisciplinary collaboration, and a strong judicial role—can further these
process-oriented goals and create a model for civil problem-solving
experimentation. Notwithstanding legitimate challenges to scaling and
sustaining civil problem-solving courts, which Part III also addresses, the
model offers an opportunity to pilot much-needed innovation in the role of
the civil judge and holds promise for improving process legitimacy in private
law matters.
In Part IV, I argue that problem-solving courts in the civil law setting
may sidestep many of the long-standing critiques of the drug court model in
the criminal arena, including responsibilization,22 net widening, and
diminished procedural protections. In criminal courts, drug courts play a
moralizing role and may inadvertently expand the reach of the criminal
justice system while at the same time disposing of defendants’ constitutional
rights. In civil cases, however, the problem-solving model would not
exacerbate the negative impact of state power on already over-burdened
groups. Instead, the targets of monitoring and behavior modification are
powerful private actors, such as landlords and debt buyers, who may
otherwise manipulate the courts—an instrument of the state—to evade their
legal obligations and suppress individual rights.
I
DRUG COURTS AND THE PROBLEM-SOLVING PHILOSOPHY

The first drug court opened in Miami in 1989, and since then, the
problem-solving model has risen to prominence in criminal courts
throughout the country. 23 Now, there are nearly 3000 drug courts, as well as
more than a thousand problem-solving courts devoted to mental health,
veteran’s affairs, reentry, domestic violence, and homelessness.24 Although
drug courts vary in philosophy and execution, 25 certain core principles
apply. 26 First, drug courts name their purpose as solving a social problem

22 See infra Section IV.A (discussing “responsibilization,” a term critiquing the government
for playing a moralizing role in its approach to substance abuse by foisting responsibility on the
defendant to treat his own addiction).
23 James L. Nolan, Jr., Therapeutic Adjudication, 39 SOC’Y 29, 29 (2002).
24 MARLOWE, HARDIN & FOX, supra note 2, at 7, 9, 12.
25 See McLeod, supra note 1, at 1611–44 (discussing various philosophies and approaches
employed by drug courts, including therapeutic justice, judicial monitoring, order maintenance, and
decarceration).
26 See Richard C. Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts and Pragmatism, 73 MD. L. REV. 1120, 1122
(2014).
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and fulfill this mission by offering treatment to low-level offenders instead
of a conventional sentence. 27 The goal is to address the underlying cause of
criminal activity, namely drug use, and by doing so to reduce recidivism and
promote healthier communities. 28 Second, the judge typically works with an
interdisciplinary team to devise a treatment plan. 29 And third, the judge, as
leader of the “treatment team,” monitors the defendant’s compliance with
the treatment regimen. 30 Individuals who successfully complete drug
treatment are rewarded with dismissal or expungement of the original
charge, while those who fail may serve a traditional jail-based sentence. 31
The drug court model has been linked to David Wexler’s theory of
therapeutic jurisprudence, which emphasizes “the law’s influence on
emotional life and psychological well-being.” 32
Drug courts are often described as an alternative to “assembly line”
justice and an effort to close the “revolving door” that cycles criminal
defendants in and out of the justice system. 33 The movement is “essentially .
. . judge-led” 34 and grew out of frustration that traditional criminal law
administration had transformed most courtrooms into plea bargain factories
where cases were disposed of quickly and little thought was given to the root
causes of crime. 35 Greg Berman and John Feinblatt, two architects of the
drug court model, frame its problem-solving approach as a response to

27

McLeod, supra note 1, at 1590–91.
See Denise C. Gottfredson, Stacy S. Najaka & Brook Kearley, Effectiveness of Drug
Treatment Courts: Evidence from a Randomized Trial, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 171, 172
(2003).
29 MARLOWE, HARDIN & FOX, supra note 2, at 11, 28, 31.
30 See Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 131–32; Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug
Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 843 (2000);
Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 423 (2009).
31 MARLOWE, HARDIN & FOX, supra note 2, at 11; JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING
JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 40 (2001); Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5,
at 126; Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1211–12 (1998).
32 David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycholegal Soft Spots and
Strategies, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45
(Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000).
33 See Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 130, 135 (discussing judges, defense attorneys and
prosecutors as working on an “assembly line” and presiding over “McJustice” courts); Michael C.
Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1502 (2004) (claiming that traditional courts create a “revolving door”); see
also Nolan, supra note 23, at 36 (noting that drug offenders were simply “recycled through the
criminal justice system”).
34 NOLAN, supra note 31, at 42.
35 See Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 129 (describing traditional courts as “plea bargain
mills”).
28
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“rising caseloads and increasing frustration—both among the public and
among system players—with the standard approach to case processing in
state courts.” 36 The Conference of Chief Justices, the highest policy-making
body of judges in the United States, has endorsed the model as a way of
responding to complex social issues, such as substance abuse, that traditional
adjudication has failed to address. 37
The crux of the drug court model is the treatment alternative to
incarceration. Rather than ordering jail time for minor offenses such as drug
possession, shoplifting, or loitering, drug courts aim to address the social
problems that drive criminal conduct. 38 By offering treatment for drug
addiction, or by connecting defendants to appropriate public services or
benefits, 39 the model seeks to prevent repeated interaction with the criminal
justice system. 40 In general, the drug court mission is outcome focused, with
far less emphasis on formal procedure. 41 When evaluated, success is
measured by completion of treatment programs and lower rates of
recidivism. 42 This orientation stands in stark contrast to conventional court
systems, where substantive outcome measures are rarely imposed, and the
36 Id. at 128. According to the National Center for State Courts, criminal caseloads rose by
nearly fifty percent between 1984 and 1998. See BRIAN J. OSTROM, NEAL B. KAUDER & ROBERT
C. LAFOUNTAIN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF THE STATE
COURTS, 1999–2000: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 14, 60
(2001). From 1993 to 2002, criminal caseloads rose by nineteen percent. DAVID B. ROTTMAN, THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, TRENDS IN STATE COURTS: RISING CASELOADS AND VANISHING
TRIALS 300 (2005). Since the early 2000s, caseloads have achieved greater stability, with no major
rise reported. See ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING
THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 20 (2012).
37 Peggy Fulton Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the Twenty-First
Century: The Evolution of the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REV. 717, 771–72
(2008).
38 Nolan, supra note 23, at 36; Shauhin Talesh, Mental Health Court Judges as Dynamic Risk
Managers: A New Conceptualization of the Role of Judges, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 93, 130 (2007).
39 GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, JUDGES AND
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 4 (2002) (“[M]any [drug court] participants find themselves linked to
an array of services (job training, health care, education, housing) designed to insure their
successful transition from addiction to sobriety.”); Jim Dwyer, A Court Keeps People Out of Rikers
While Remaining Tough, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2BAdtZG (describing the
Red Hook Community Court, which connects defendants with social services on the spot); see also
MARLOWE, HARDIN & FOX, supra note 2, at 11–12, 14 (describing the array of services often
provided to problem-solving court participants).
40 See Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 131; Gottfredson, Najaka & Kearley, supra note
28, at 172 (“Drug treatment courts are designed to increase the likelihood that drug-addicted
offenders will seek and persist longer in drug treatment, which is expected to help these individuals
reduce their drug dependence and develop healthier, more productive, and crime-free lifestyles.”);
Judith S. Kaye, Making the Case for Hands-On Courts, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1999, at 13.
41 See Boldt, supra note 26, at 1129 (describing problem-solving courts as “offer[ing] the
promise of informal, individualized engagement by judges and other court officials in order to find
‘what works’ instead of settling for the operation of formal, rule-based procedures that to not”).
42 Cf. Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 131 (describing reduced recidivism as a goal of
problem-solving courts).
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focus instead is on rapid case resolution 43 and the application of law to facts
irrespective of the impact of the court’s decision on the defendant’s life and
future prospects. 44 Indeed, traditional courts derive their legitimacy from the
perception that the judge is impartial and dispassionate with regard to the
outcome. 45 Drug court judges are not neutral in the same way; they name
particular outcome-based goals and use the authority of the court to motivate
defendants to remain in treatment.
Interdisciplinary teams are an important component of drug courts’
problem-solving model. Judges collaborate with social workers, treatment
providers, probation workers, and lawyers to develop and supervise
treatment plans. 46 In place of an adversary process, the various actors in the
legal system work together to promote the defendant’s compliance with the
prescribed program. Some commentators have criticized the team approach,
noting that it can erode the defendant’s due process rights as well as defense
counsel’s advocacy role. 47 However, the interdisciplinary team also offers a
distinct advantage in providing the court with expertise on specific social
issues such as addiction and mental illness, and in educating the court on the
challenges faced by specific population subgroups, such as veterans,
homeless individuals, or returning citizens. 48 This expertise can be
43 See Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 135 (“[F]or a long time, my claim to fame was that
I arraigned 200 cases in one session. That’s ridiculous. . . . I’d be handed the papers, say the
sentence is going to be five days, ten days, whatever, never even looking at the defendant.” (quoting
an administrative judge for New York City’s criminal courts)).
44 Judge Ferdinand recalls that, as a traditional criminal trial judge, she said on “many, many
occasions . . . ‘I am constrained by the law not to grant that motion’ or ‘I am unable to reach some
conclusion despite the obvious fairness of that result.’” Jo Ann Ferdinand et al., The Judicial
Perspective, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2011, 2013 (2002).
45 Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving Courts and the
Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1499 (2004).
46 See DRUG POLICY ALL., DRUG COURTS ARE NOT THE ANSWER: TOWARD A HEALTHCENTERED APPROACH TO DRUG USE 6 (2011); Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 131–32;
Miller, supra note 30, at 423; Michael L. Perlin, “The Judge, He Cast His Robe Aside”: Mental
Health Courts, Dignity and Due Process, 3 MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL’Y J., no. 1, 2013, at 1, 12.
47 See Boldt, supra note 31, at 1255–60 (noting criticisms of defense counsel’s role in drug
court treatment programs); Eric J. Miller, The Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts,
20 FED. SENT’G REP. 127, 129 (2007) (noting concern about lack of due process); Perlin, supra
note 46, at 18–19 (noting concern about erosion of advocacy role); Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team
Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 56–58 (2000) (same).
48 See McLeod, supra note 1, at 1613 (characterizing “therapeutic judges” as “active and
engaged, invested in acquiring expertise regarding the problems they address”); Anthony C.
Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts on Community Courts, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
63, 75 (2002) (“[T]he intense focus on drug addiction by professionals in the justice system and
medical field through drug courts has helped increase the courts’ understanding of the nature of
addiction.”).
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invaluable in formulating appropriate and individualized treatment plans that
take into account the nature of the underlying issue, the behavioral patterns
that courts may witness as defendants engage with treatment and the need to
develop constructive responses to relapse. 49
Perhaps most importantly, drug courts rely heavily on an active judge
to monitor the defendant’s progress. 50 In the drug court context, Michael
Dorf and Charles Sabel describe the “central innovation” of the problemsolving model as the requirement that each defendant “appear in court
regularly” accompanied by the treatment provider’s report. 51 The judge is the
leader of the treatment team and interacts directly with defendants to discuss
progress or setbacks in treatment. 52 Praise, applause, token prizes, and
graduation ceremonies are offered to defendants who exhibit good
performance. 53 For those who fail drug tests, or otherwise refuse to comply
with treatment goals, judges issue warnings, reprimands, or sanctions that
may include community service, more frequent hearings, or even short stints
in jail. 54 Direct and immediate accountability to the judge is a hallmark of
the drug court model 55 and is thought to have a positive impact on retention
in the program. 56

49 See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 39, at 5; Thompson, supra note 48, at 75 (noting
that drug court judges “have come to expect that an individual will relapse during the process of
recovery” and have designed a system of incentives and treatment that evidence a “depth of
understanding of the pull of addiction . . . not evident among judges before the advent of drug
courts”).
50 GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING
JUSTICE 35 (2005); Richard Boldt & Jana Singer, Juristocracy in the Trenches: Problem-Solving
Judges and Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Drug Treatment Courts and Unified Family Courts, 65
MD. L. REV. 82, 84, 87 n.21 (2000); Casey, supra note 45, at 1462.
51 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 30, at 843.
52 DRUG POLICY ALL., supra note 46, at 5–6.
53 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 30, at 846–48 (discussing ceremonies, applause, and tokens
of progress); Gottfredson, Najaka & Kearley, supra note 28, at 172 (discussing judicial praise for
successful program performance); Nolan, supra note 23, at 29 (describing use of “praise, applause,
and prizes” for defendants who stay committed to drug treatment).
54 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 30, at 846–48 (discussing sanctions, demotions to an earlier
program phase, and short period of incarceration); Gottfredson, Najaka & Kearley, supra note 28,
at 177; Nolan, supra note 23, at 29. Although much scholarly and media attention has been devoted
to the use of jail time as a sanction in drug courts, the director of the National Association of Drug
Court Professionals stated on This American Life that “[a]ny drug court that relies primarily on jail,
or punishment generally, is operating way outside our philosophy and just does not understand
addiction.” Very Tough Love: Act One at 15:21, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (Mar. 25, 2011),
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/430/very-tough-love. He reported that most drug courts use jail
very infrequently, and for short timeframes like “12 hours, 24 hours.” Id. at 16:30.
55 See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 39, at 5 (“Instead of passing off cases after rendering
a sentence—to other judges, to probation departments, to community-based treatment programs or,
in all too many cases, to no one at all—judges at problem-solving courts stay involved with each
case over the long haul.”).
56 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, DEFINING DRUG COURTS:
THE KEY COMPONENTS 15 (1997); Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review—
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As a condition of federal funding, problem-solving courts have been
subject to rigorous evaluation by social scientists. 57 The mechanics and
outcomes of drug courts, in particular, have been studied extensively. While
the data are not entirely consistent, the efficacy of the drug court model is
largely supported by empirical data. A number of randomized trials and
meta-analyses of observational studies have concluded that drug courts
lower recidivism rates and promote abstention from drug use. 58 There is also
evidence that the model reduces reliance on incarceration as a way to manage
drug-addicted or mentally ill individuals.59 There is reason, therefore, to
consider the extension of drug courts’ problem-solving principles to the civil
courts, where thorny social issues also arise and are ill-suited to resolution
through traditional case processing.

1999 Update, NAT’L DRUG CT. INST. REV., Winter 1999, at 1, 23 (noting that in one study, drug
court graduates reported that the one of the most important elements of drug court helping them
stay drug-free was the close judicial monitoring); Douglas B. Marlowe, David S. Festinger &
Patricia A. Lee, The Judge Is a Key Component of Drug Court, 4 DRUG CT. REV., no. 2, 2004, at
1, 5 (finding that high-risk defendants fared better when they had to make regular appearances
before a judge).
57 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-53, ADULT DRUG COURTS: STUDIES
SHOW COURTS REDUCE RECIDIVISM, BUT DOJ COULD ENHANCE FUTURE PERFORMANCE
MEASURE REVISION EFFORTS 2 (2011).
58 See, e.g., id. at 19 (finding the re-arrest rate for drug court participants was lower than for
comparison group members by six to twenty-six percent); Belenko, supra note 56, at 5 (reviewing
twenty-nine evaluations of thirty different drug courts, and finding that drug courts reduce drug use
and criminal behavior while offenders are participating in drug court, and also that drug courts
reduce recidivism for participants after they leave the program); Gottfredson, Najaka & Kearley,
supra note 28, at 188–89 (reporting a fourteen percent reduction in recidivism for drug court
participants in Baltimore arising out of a randomized experiment); Deborah Koetzle et al., Treating
High-Risk Offenders in the Community: The Potential of Drug Courts, 59 INT’L J. OFFENDER
THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 449, 450 (2015) (citing many major studies conducted from
2000 to 2011); David B. Wilson et al., A Systematic Review of Drug Court Effects on Recidivism,
2 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 459, 459 (2006) (describing a meta-analytical review in which
“[t]he overall findings tentatively suggest that drug offenders participating in a drug court are less
likely to reoffend than similar offenders sentenced to traditional correctional options”). But see
Elizabeth Piper Deschenes et al., Drug Court or Probation? An Experimental Evaluation of
Maricopa County’s Drug Court, 18 JUST. SYS. J., no. 1, 1995, at 55, 55 (randomly assigning 630
defendants to either drug court or routine probation, and finding no statistically significant
difference between the control and treatment groups in terms of new arrests, although drug court
participants had a lower overall rate of drug violations).
59 See McLeod, supra note 1, at 1642 n.224, 1650–51 (citing various studies demonstrating
that problem-solving courts can successfully divert defendants with mental health and substance
abuse issues to alternative programming). But see Richard C. Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts, in 3
REFORMING
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
273,
285–86
(Erik
Luna
ed.,
2017),
http://academyforjustice.org/volume3/ (characterizing the “scorecard for drug-treatment court
success” as “guardedly optimistic,” but pointing out that most drug court studies measure
recidivism, whereas outcomes on housing and employment status are considerably more mixed).
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II
UNRESOLVED SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE CIVIL COURTS—AND THE STRUCTURAL
FORCES TO BLAME

Outside of family law matters, the civil courts have been left largely
untouched by the drug court movement’s pioneering problem-solving
philosophy. 60 Very little experimentation has entered the civil justice realm,
and traditional methods of case resolution remain the only option for most
litigants and judges. However, much like the criminal courts, the civil courts
also confront a number of entrenched social problems that conventional
adjudication has proven powerless to address. Relying on illustrations from
the two most commonly adjudicated disputes in the civil arena, rental
housing and consumer debt, this Part highlights the social issues at stake, and
examines three structural forces that allow powerful interests to coopt the
courts as institutional partners in the perpetuation of unjust and socially
detrimental outcomes. In the same way that overcrowded dockets and the
inefficacy of traditional process led to the drug court movement in the
criminal justice system, analogous structural conditions in the civil courts
invite adaptation of the drug court’s problem-solving model to civil justice
matters.
A.

Unresolved Social Problems in the Civil Courts

Together, eviction and debt collection comprise nearly half of all
litigation in the civil courts.61 While these cases are often construed as
matters of individual contract, they also invoke, in the aggregate, a number
of pressing social problems that the courts have not been able to address.
1. Substandard Housing Conditions
Renters are the subject of aggressive and relentless eviction actions in
many areas of the country. 62 In Baltimore, for example, the number of

60 For examples of similarities between drug court and family court, see Barbara A. Babb,
Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for Court Reform in Family Law: A Blueprint to
Construct a Unified Family Court, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 469, 507 (1998) (offering a new framework
for family court reform based on mental health); Boldt & Singer, supra note 50, at 91–95
(comparing and contrasting unified family courts to drug courts).
61 Excluding family courts, forty-three percent of civil cases are debt collection or eviction.
See PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL JUSTICE
INITIATIVE: THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS, at iii (2015).
62 The number of evictions may even undercount the overall figure of forced moves. See
Andrew Flowers, How We Undercounted Evictions by Asking the Wrong Questions,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 15, 2016), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-we-undercountedevictions-by-asking-the-wrong-questions/ (reporting on data from the Milwaukee Area Renters
Study which demonstrated that “forced moves” outside of the courts occurred twice as often as
formal evictions).
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eviction actions exceeds the number of renter-occupied households by a
significant margin, 63 and evictions make up the majority of district court
litigation. 64 In cost-burdened households the impact is greatest, with families
sometimes subject to three evictions per year. 65 In Cleveland, for example,
more than ten percent of renters are summoned to eviction court each year, 66
and even in New Jersey, where tenant protections are among the strongest in
the country, one in six renters defended against an eviction in court in the
2013–2014 fiscal year. 67 These figures do not even take into account the
number of “forced moves” that occur in the shadow of the law. 68
The landlord’s allegations in an eviction suit typically charge the tenant
with violating the terms of the lease, most often by failing to pay rent. 69 And
while the contractual breach may be easy to prove and even uncontested,
lurking below the surface is the tenant’s mutually enforceable right to safe
and sanitary housing conditions.
The implied warranty of habitability, enacted by ordinance or
developed through common law in every jurisdiction in the country, makes
mutually enforceable the landlord’s right to demand rent payment and the
tenant’s right to seek repairs of defective housing conditions. 70 Therefore,
when courts process evictions, they also—whether explicitly or not—come
into contact with one of the most intractable social problems facing lowincome communities: the prevalence of substandard housing. A recent
community listening project in the District of Columbia identified housing
as the single most pervasive concern among the survey’s respondents.71
More than a third of individuals who participated in the study felt their
housing conditions were unsafe, and forty percent experienced problems
63 See PUB. JUSTICE CTR., supra note 10, at 56 (reporting that, in 2013, there were 124,782
renter-occupied units and 156,476 evictions filed, for an average of 1.25 evictions per household,
and identifying similar statistics for 2000 and 2009).
64 See id. at 4 (noting that Baltimore’s District Court had 278,809 annual filings in 2014, and
148,189 were evictions).
65 Id. at 5.
66 See MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 296 &
n.10 (2016).
67 Shaila Dewan, Evictions Soar in Hot Market; Renters Suffer, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014),
https://nyti.ms/2C5gnqC.
68 See generally DESMOND, supra note 66 (documenting extreme housing instability among
renters due to the ever-present threat of eviction).
69 For instance, in New York City, eighty-one percent of residential evictions during 2013
alleged nonpayment of rent. See N.Y.C. CIVIL COURT, STATISTICAL REPORT OF ACTIVITY OF
LANDLORD & TENANT CLERK’S OFFICE, 2013 TERM 1 (2014).
70 E.g., Super, supra note 10, at 394.
71 See FAITH MULLEN & ENRIQUE PUMAR, D.C. CONSORTIUM OF LEGAL SERVS. PROVIDERS,
THE COMMUNITY LISTENING PROJECT 1–2, 8 (2016), https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar/948/.
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keeping up with rent increases and seeking repairs from their landlords. 72 In
Milwaukee, ethnographic work shows that nearly half of renters lived with a
long and lasting habitability problem between 2009 and 2011. 73
Regulatory bodies, such as code enforcement agencies, are charged
with improving the housing stock, but many such agencies have been
plagued by inefficiencies, underfunding, mismanagement, and even
corruption. 74 As a result, the courts have become a critical forum of last resort
for administering the implied warranty of habitability. In a well-functioning
adjudication system, tenants would raise defective housing conditions as a
defense against eviction, or to lower their rent obligation, and the courts
would regularly enforce such rights as a matter of substantive law. Instead,
the courts churn through housing cases at breakneck speed, typically
authorizing eviction while ignoring the ever-present and interconnected
problem of substandard housing. 75
2. Consumer Protection
Debt collection is the other dominant source of litigation in the civil
courts. In New York City, for example, creditors sued 135,000 individuals
for defaulting on consumer debt in 2011, accounting for nearly four out of
ten civil filings. 76 In some jurisdictions, the deluge of debt collection
litigation is even greater. The Texas Office of Court Administration reports
72

Id. at 2.
DESMOND, supra note 66, at 76 (noting that almost half of renters experienced housing
problems like a broken window, a non-functioning appliance, or vermin).
74 See Debbie Cenziper & Sarah Cohen, The Profit in Decay: Landlords Who Empty Buildings
of Tenants Reap Extra Benefit Under Law, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/03/08/ST2008030803137.html
(finding city officials in Washington, D.C. improperly granted housing code exemptions to
landlords converting rental units to condominiums); Benjamin Mueller, New York City Buildings
Inspectors
Charged
in
Bribe
Schemes,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
10,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/nyregion/new-york-city-buildings-inspectors-chargedwith-bribery.html (reporting on charges that more than a dozen New York City buildings inspectors
accepted bribes to clear complaints, expedite inspections, and improperly remove tenants); David
Zahniser, Los Angeles Building Inspector Gets Prison in Felony Bribery Case, L.A. TIMES (Mar.
25, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/25/local/la-me-building-inspector-corruption20140325 (reporting on sentencing of former building inspector in Los Angeles who accepted
bribes for more than a dozen properties he was responsible for).
75 See PUB. JUSTICE CTR., supra note 10, at 14, 36 (reporting that seventy-eight percent of
renters experienced serious habitability issues, but only eight percent successfully raised their
defective housing conditions in court); Kathyrn A. Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon,
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 56, 103–04, 107–09 (2018); Super, supra note 10, at 437–38 (referring to
Cleveland and Detroit, two cities in which landlords won eviction judgments in nearly all cases
despite evidence that housing conditions were substantially worsening).
76 SUSAN SHIN & CLAUDIA WILNER, NEW ECON. PROJECT, THE DEBT COLLECTION RACKET
IN NEW YORK: HOW THE INDUSTRY VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND PERPETUATES ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY 6 (Sarah Ludwig & Josh Zinner eds., 2013) (reporting that, in New York City in 2011,
of the 370,924 civil court filings in New York City Civil Court, 134,980 were debt collections).
73
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that “suits on debt” account for 43.8% of cases in county-level courts
statewide. 77 The rate of debt collection litigation is subject to rapid growth
in times of economic volatility. In three San Francisco Bay Area counties,
consumer debt cases increased by eighty percent from 2007 to 2009. 78
High levels of debt drive poverty and income inequality, and collection
litigation can deepen the effects of both.79 A creditor who obtains a court
judgment for unpaid debt may garnish wages and attach liens on real
property, making it more difficult for cash-strapped families to pay bills or
sell existing assets to support their needs. 80 In addition, collection suits may
impede recovery from a period of financial instability, as big data companies
often bundle and sell information on recent judgments to prospective
landlords and employers, exposing otherwise private economic struggles and
potentially complicating efforts to find new housing or a job. 81 The Federal
Reserve estimates that, in April 2016, consumer debt reached 3.6 trillion
dollars, up nearly fifty percent from 2.41 trillion in January 2011. 82
Protection against consumer fraud is vitally important to fair debt
collection. Empirical research suggests that fraudulent practices fuel the
collection of debt nationwide. 83 In one study, debt buyers prevailed in ninety77

Spector, supra note 12, at 273.
https://consumersunion.org/pdf/Past_Due_Report_2011.pdf.
79 See ADP RESEARCH INST., GARNISHMENT: THE UNTOLD STORY 6 (2014) (describing the
financial and psychological stresses associated with garnishment); Aimee Constantineau,
Comment, Fair for Whom? Why Debt-Collection Lawsuits in St. Louis Violate the Procedural Due
Process Rights of Low-Income Communities, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 479, 486–87 (2016) (describing
how garnishment compounds inequality); Paul Kiel, Old Debts, Fresh Pain: Weak Laws Offer
Debtors Little Protection, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/olddebts-fresh-pain-weak-laws-offer-debtors-little-protection (describing, inter alia, the expense of
litigation).
80 FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT
COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 5–6 (2010).
81 MAUREEN MAHONEY, CONSUMERS UNION, ERRORS AND GOTCHAS: HOW CREDIT REPORT
ERRORS AND UNRELIABLE CREDIT SCORES HURT CONSUMERS 11, 19 (2014) (describing the
impact of such information on the ability to procure loans and employment); James A. Francis, The
FCRA: A Double-Edged Sword for Consumer Data Sellers, GPSOLO, Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 36,
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2012/november_december2012privacyandcon
fidentiality/fcra_double_edged_sword_consumer_data_sellers.html (describing how credit data
threatens consumer privacy).
82 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STATISTICAL RELEASE: CONSUMER
CREDIT—APRIL 2016 (2016) (putting total outstanding seasonally adjusted consumer debt in April
2016 at 3.601 trillion); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STATISTICAL RELEASE:
CONSUMER CREDIT—JANUARY 2011 (2011) (putting total outstanding seasonally adjusted
consumer debt in January 2011 at 2.412 trillion).
83 See generally STIFLER & PARRISH, supra note 11 (describing how debt collection and
misinformation expose American households to harassment and other illegal conduct); Stifler,
supra note 20, at 107 (describing how deceptive practices like inadequately proven or time-barred
78
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four percent of consumer debt cases, despite widespread evidence that many
collections suits were premised on procedural and substantive law
violations. 84 Another study found that eighty percent of debt cases examined
involved consumer protection violations that were never raised, ultimately
resulting in judgments for creditors. 85 In yet a third study, up to seventy-eight
percent of collections complaints did not meet pleading and proof standards,
and yet almost half of creditors still won their cases. 86 Debt collectors also
obtain quick and easy judgments against consumers even where the right to
recover on the unpaid account may have been encumbered by the staleness
of the debt or the discharge of the debt through bankruptcy. 87 Following a
series of roundtable discussions with advocates, judges, and collections
industry personnel, the Federal Trade Commission concluded that, on the
measure of consumer protection, the court process was “broken.” 88
B.

Structural Failings in Civil Adjudication

This Section argues that three structural conditions may explain why
the civil courts produce poor social outcomes on critical and recurring issues
such as substandard housing and consumer protection. Specifically, I
identify low rates of attorney representation, high-volume dockets, and the
capture of small claims tribunals by corporate interests as forces that weaken
the capacity of traditional courts to solve social problems for particular
groups of litigants. The account of civil adjudication offered in this Section

debt go unchallenged).
84 THE LEGAL AID SOC’Y ET AL., DEBT DECEPTION: HOW DEBT BUYERS ABUSE THE LEGAL
SYSTEM TO PREY ON LOWER-INCOME NEW YORKERS 1–2 (2010) (asserting that debt buyers
prevailed in 94.3% of lawsuits, and of these, 35% of cases were clearly meritless, and 71% of
people sued were either not served or served improperly).
85 Hillard M. Sterling & Philip G. Schrag, Default Judgments Against Consumers: Has the
System Failed?, 67 DENV. L. REV. 357, 384 (1990).
86 See Spector, supra note 12, at 293–96 (finding that, despite 78% of the cases studied having
only one affidavit, filed by an employee of the plaintiff, plaintiffs still obtained default or agreed
judgments in 39.46% and 4.93% of cases, respectively).
87 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 80, at ii (noting the Commission’s concerns about the
high rate of default judgments and the practice of brining actions on time-barred debts); see also
RICK JURGENS & ROBERT J. HOBBS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE DEBT MACHINE: HOW
THE COLLECTION INDUSTRY HOUNDS CONSUMERS AND OVERWHELMS COURTS 18 (2010)
(discussing how debtors may face years of badgering from creditors for claims discharged in
bankruptcy); RACHEL TERP, E. BAY CMTY. LAW CTR., & LAUREN BROWNE, CONSUMERS UNION,
PAST DUE: WHY DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES AND THE DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY NEED
REFORM NOW 4–5 (2011).
88 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 80, at i–ii, 17; see also THE LEGAL AID SOC’Y ET AL.,
supra note 84, at 1 (describing a deluge of frivolous lawsuits filed by debt buyers); Peter A.
Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt Buyers, 26 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 179, 233 (2014) (referring to a “broken debt collection system”); Stifler, supra
note 20, at 93 (listing common debt-collecting abuses like insufficient evidence, time-barred
collection, and robo-signing).
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suggests structural conditions in the civil courts that parallel those in the
criminal courts and may justify consideration of problem-solving methods.
1. Hardly Any Lawyers
According to the National Center for State Courts, seventy-six percent
of cases in the civil courts now involve an unrepresented party. 89 In 1992,
the last time comprehensive national data were collected, the pro se rate was
just twenty-four percent. 90 This sea change over the past twenty-five years
has resulted in a state civil justice system defined by the effects of systemic
lack of counsel.
In rental housing and consumer debt cases, low rates of attorney
representation are particularly problematic for two reasons. First,
representation rates for tenants and consumers are among the lowest of all
groups in the civil justice system. In New York, Maryland, and the District
of Columbia, among many other jurisdictions, the representation rate for
tenants hovers at around ten percent or less. 91 Consumers fare no better, with
the pro se rate sometimes reported to be as high as ninety-nine percent. 92
Second, lopsided representation in housing and consumer matters is
standard, meaning that the more powerful party to the litigation is highly
likely to have an attorney, while the less powerful party almost never does.
In many courts, landlord representation rates are around ninety percent.93
Similar statistics are often cited for debt buyers and other creditors.94 In some
jurisdictions, corporations are required to appear in court through attorneys,
ensuring that virtually all plaintiffs in consumer debt cases will be
89 HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 61, at iii–iv (basing this figure on a survey of almost
one million cases in 152 general jurisdiction courts).
90 Id. at 28.
91 Steinberg, supra, note 13. at 750.
92 THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., REPORT TO THE
CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1 (2010); see also Spector, supra note 12, at 297
(finding over ninety percent of defendants in consumer debt cases in Texas were either pro se or
made no appearance).
93 D.C. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, JUSTICE FOR ALL? AN EXAMINATION OF THE CIVIL
LEGAL NEEDS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S LOW-INCOME COMMUNITY 74 (2008) (revealing
ninety percent of landlords had counsel in a survey of Washington, D.C.); WILLIAM E. MORRIS
INST. FOR JUSTICE, INJUSTICE IN NO TIME: THE EXPERIENCE OF TENANTS IN MARICOPA COUNTY
JUSTICE COURTS 8 (2005) (finding eighty-seven percent of cases in study were brought by
represented landlords); Rashida Abuwala & Donald J. Farole, The Perceptions of Self-Represented
Tenants in a Community-Based Housing Court, 44 CT. REV., no. 1/2, 2007, at 56 (reporting that
ninety-eight percent of landlords were represented, according to one report of New York City).
94 See STAUFFER, supra note 17, at 4 (describing the plaintiffs in debt collection cases as “large
corporations represented by top-tier collections attorneys,” while “hardly any of the defendants in
debt buyer lawsuits have legal representation”).
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represented. 95
High rates of lopsided representation have had an enormous impact on
case adjudication in the civil courts. The side without counsel is likely to
have difficulty identifying legally cognizable claims and parsing through the
procedural thicket of case presentation.96 Without attorney guidance, for
instance, tenants may be unaware of their rights to raise substandard housing
as a defense to an eviction. 97 Similarly, consumers may not be familiar with
the procedural and evidentiary rules required to stave off the collection of
stale debt. 98 As a result, it is not uncommon for landlords or creditors to
control entirely the facts and evidence considered by the judge, and to do so
across an entire docket. This type of information asymmetry compromises
accurate judicial decision-making and leads to the gross under-enforcement
of rights for particular classes of litigants.
2. High-Volume Dockets
High-volume dockets present a second structural problem in the civil
courts. With millions of rental housing and consumer cases to contend with,
courts struggle to offer litigants a genuine opportunity to adjudicate their
claims.
To winnow caseloads to a manageable figure, the civil justice system
tolerates, and perhaps even promotes, a high rate of default. 99 In consumer
matters, for example, many jurisdictions have reported default rates as high
as sixty to ninety-five percent. 100 Unique to the civil courts, default

95 For example, corporations must be represented by counsel in both Arkansas and Arizona.
See ARK. CODE § 16-22-211(a)–(d) (2018); see also Boydston v. Strole Dev. Co., 969 P.2d 653
(Ariz. 1998).
96 See Colleen F. Shanahan, Anna E. Carpenter & Alyx Mark, Lawyers, Power, and Strategic
Expertise, 93 DENV. L. REV. 469, 489–504 (2016) (surveying the effect of expertise in
representation); Steinberg, supra note 13, at 755–56, 794–95 (describing the difficulties faced by
those litigants who represent themselves at trial and arguing for reform).
97 See PUB. JUSTICE CTR., supra note 10, at 19.
98 See Spector, supra note 12, at 280–82.
99 See Jonathan I. Rose & Martin A. Scott, “Street Talk” Summonses in Detroit’s LandlordTenant Court: A Small Step Forward for Urban Tenants, 52 U. Detroit J. URB. L. 967, 988 & n.88
(1975) (quoting a judge as saying that housing court is so packed “the clerk calls defaults as soon
as possible to ease the congestion . . . [thereby working] hardship on the tenants”) (alterations in
original); Super, supra note 10, at 434–35 (“Courts depend on default judgments to control their
dockets and design procedures to obtain them whenever possible, typically requiring no motion or
affidavit . . . before entering a default judgment.”).
100 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 80, at 7; see also SHIN & WILNER, supra note 76, at 6
(listing the default rate for Syracuse City Court as sixty-two percent). Even in Dallas County, Texas,
which boasts among the lowest reported default rates in debt collection suits, the figure still rose to
nearly forty percent. Spector, supra note 12, at 263. Default rates are also high in housing matters.
See Erik Larson, Case Characteristics and Defendant Tenant Default in a Housing Court, 3 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 121, 130 (2006) (studying a housing court in Hennepin County,
Minnesota with a default rate of 40.4%).
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judgments effectively preclude defendants from participating in the litigation
brought against them, instead awarding all requested relief to the plaintiff,
often without requiring testimony or proof on the asserted claims. Research
conducted by Human Rights Watch describes the casual way in which courts
process default judgments in collections matters, typically without requiring
the debt collector to testify, appear in court, or otherwise establish a valid
claim: “Some judges routinely enter hundreds of default judgments for debt
buyers in the space of just a few hours. One judge [said] that he does this at
home while relaxing on a Sunday afternoon.” 101
To further manage high-volume dockets, the civil courts encourage a
substantial portion of non-defaulting cases to be resolved through
unmonitored settlement negotiations. 102 Russell Engler has described the
pressure tenants face to enter quick agreements in the courthouse hallways
without legal advice or judicial oversight.103 In the District of Columbia,
judges in housing court routinely abort hearings to instruct pro se tenants to
barter directly with their represented adversaries outside the courtroom. 104
While settlement is promoted across the civil spectrum, and often can
be in the parties’ best interests, 105 it reliably produces pernicious results for
unrepresented litigants—particularly those who must negotiate with an
attorney. 106 In a study I conducted in a Silicon Valley housing court in
2009, 107 tenants who settled their eviction lawsuits fared even worse as a
101

STAUFFER, supra note 17, at 3–4.
The inherently unbalanced nature of many settlement negotiations in the civil setting
parallels the way in which criminal defendants are so often cajoled into striking unfair plea deals
with prosecutors.
103 See Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’
Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 79, 104, 109 (1997); see also
Sabbeth, supra note 75, at 79–80 (similarly describing rushed, unfavorable hallway settlements).
For discussion of a similar dynamic in consumer cases, see STAUFFER, supra note 17, at 3–4
(discussing the common judicial practice in consumer debt matters to “push defendants into
unsupervised ‘discussions’ with debt buyer attorneys” in the hallways of the courthouse “in hopes
that the parties will settle and obviate the need for a trial”).
104 This is drawn from my personal observations in D.C.’s landlord-tenant court.
105 See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation
of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340, 1350–51 (1994) (describing the growing sentiment
among the judiciary that settlement is part of the judicial role, and listing the many perceived
benefits of settlement).
106 See Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data
Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 47–48 (2010); Erica L.
Fox, Note, Alone in the Hallway: Challenges to Effective Self-Representation in Negotiation, 1
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 85, 102–03 (1996). Similar conditions plague negotiated agreements in the
consumer setting. Holland, supra note 88, at 213–14, 224–25.
107 See Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of
Unbundled Legal Services, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 453 (2011).
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group than those who defaulted. How, one might ask, is this even possible?
In the study, on average, those who defaulted lost their homes but usually
avoided liability for unpaid rent, as most landlords chose not to pursue a
separate damages award after winning possession of the unit. 108 By contrast,
the settling tenants lost their homes and agreed to pay at least a portion of
back rent—meaning they “negotiated” for the worst possible outcome. 109
This illustration highlights how unmonitored settlements often promote the
interests of landlords to the exclusion of tenants’ rights. 110
Finally, even the cases that outlive both default judgment and
unmonitored settlement negotiations face overburdened courts unable to
offer a meaningful adjudicatory process. 111 Trials are typically handled by
judges, not juries, and a number of commentators have pointed to the
condensed interval in which testimony and evidence is gathered and
weighed. Hearings lasting only a few minutes are not uncommon, 112 and
judges may preside over as many as one hundred cases in a single day. 113 An
Indiana appellate decision recently chided an eviction court for having a
court reporter—rather than a judge—preside over a hearing, and for
presenting the tenant “with a pre-signed order requiring her to vacate the
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See id. at 487, 491, 493.
See id.
110 See 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 956, 958 (Civ. Ct. 1992) (vacating a
stipulation reached by a landlord and a tenant in New York City partially on the grounds that tenant
was unrepresented and case provided a “textbook example of a one-sided stipulation unadvisedly
signed by a pro se litigant who lacked knowledge of a defense which would have substantially
defeated petitioner’s claims”); see also PUB. JUSTICE CTR., supra note 10, at 28–29 (relating the
difficulty tenants experienced when trying to negotiate); Engler, supra note 103, at 113 (discussing
how tenants may unwittingly waive rights during settlements).
111 In consumer matters, trials are arguably even scarcer than in housing cases. Judith L. Fox,
Do We Have a Debt Collection Crisis? Some Cautionary Tales of Debt Collection in Indiana, 24
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 355, 370, 379 (2012) (reporting that in the author’s study of 640
consumer cases, not a single matter involved a trial); Holland, supra note 88, at 186–87.
112 See 144 Woodruff Corp., 585 N.Y.S.2d at 960 (reporting that housing cases are often
“disposed of at an average rate of five to fourteen minutes per case”); LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR
BETTER HOUS., supra note 16, at 4 (reporting on the results of an eleven-week study of 763 eviction
cases in Chicago’s eviction courts, which “revealed problematic trends in a number of areas”
including “hearings [that] last an average of 1 minute and 44 seconds, a decrease of nearly 50%
from the 3 minutes observed in 1996”); WILLIAM E. MORRIS INST. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 93, at
9 (discussing a 2004 study of evictions cases in Maricopa County, Arizona, in which a “call for
evictions can have at least 30 to 60 cases for disposition in 60 minutes or less” and noting that, “[i]n
some courts, the evictions are set one each minute”).
113 See Fox, supra note 106, at 91 (noting that Boston Housing Court judges preside over 250
to 300 cases per day); Robert Rubinson, There Is No Such Thing as Litigation: Access to Justice
and the Realities of Adjudication, 18 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 185, 200 (2015) (noting that
Baltimore’s rent court, which has one judge assigned per day, hears 1050 cases per day); Jessica
K. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and Judicial Role Confusion in “Small Case” Civil Justice,
2016 BYU L. REV. 899, 969 (2016) (noting that a judge may interact with over 100 pro se litigants
per day).
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premises” and no opportunity to defend against the ejectment. 114
This system of defaults, settlements, and abbreviated hearings
exacerbates the imbalance in party power created by lopsided representation
and creates a procedural structure that—almost by design—privileges the
rights of more powerful actors.
3. Capture of Small Claims Courts
The capture of small claims courts by corporate interests presents a third
structural force that undermines the effectiveness of existing adjudication
models in resolving entrenched social problems. In its heyday, the small
claims movement was hailed as a potential fix for the cost and complexity of
traditional proceedings. 115 With relaxed rules of evidence and procedure, the
idea was that ordinary laymen could share their stories in narrative fashion,
interact directly with judges, and generally participate more actively in their
cases. 116 While most proponents of the model focused on the prospect of
efficient and accurate dispute resolution in individual cases, had the small
claims system fulfilled its promise, a positive systemic effect on social issues
certainly would have been felt.
Instead, the small claims system is gripped by the same power dynamics
that control the traditional courts, and has largely replicated the same results.
As one prominent example, small claims tribunals have become the preferred
venue for corporate creditors prosecuting unpaid debt claims. 117 A 2006
investigation by the Boston Globe revealed that, in Boston, 40,000 debt
collection suits accounted for eighty-five percent of all cases in the state’s
busiest small claims court. 118 The National Center for State Courts reports
that three-quarters of plaintiffs in small claims cases are represented by an
attorney, raising “troubling concerns,” that the system, which was originally

114 Reynolds v. Capps, 968 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Similar processes are
common in debt collection cases. See Stifler, supra note 20, at 114–15.
115 See Barbara Yngvesson & Patricia Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review
of the Small Claims Literature, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 219, 221–22 (1975).
116 See id.; see also JURGENS & HOBBS, supra note 87, at 12–13.
117 HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 61, at v, 33; see also JURGENS & HOBBS, supra note
87, at 12 (“To observe the reach and power of the modern debt machine, one need only pay a visit
to a local small claims court. Every day hundreds of these low-level state courts mass produce
judgments against debtors. . . . The debt machine has transformed the character of many small
claims courts.”).
118 See Beth Healy, Dignity Faces a Steamroller: Small-Claims Proceedings Ignore Rights, Tilt
to
Collectors,
BOS.
GLOBE
(July
31,
2006),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2006/07/31/dignity-facessteamroller/SoK0TBVHzOzjLEpNqNrVYN/story.html.
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developed as a forum in which primarily self-represented litigants could use
a simplified process to resolve civil cases quickly and fairly, now “provide[s]
a much less evenly balanced playing field than was originally intended.” 119
Judges have allowed corporate parties to exploit the informal regime of
small claims courts to their advantage. Creditors, for example, often rely on
flimsy hearsay evidence and bad faith procedural wrangling to pursue
lawsuits of dubious merit. 120 One common practice is “robo-signing,” a tactic
in which employees of debt collectors “sign affidavits attesting that they
have personally reviewed and verified debtors’ records, when in fact they
have only looked at basic account information on a computer screen.” 121
Furthermore, the debt buyers often “have no proof that the debt even existed,
let alone that the person they are suing was responsible for it.” 122 Mary
Spector explains that consumer debt is often bundled and sold several times;
at the time of sale, the debt buyer rarely receives more than a computer record
summarizing the names of the consumers and the total amount each owes. 123
Despite this exchange of limited information, in Professor Spector’s study of
Texas debt collection practices, more than seventy-eight percent of all cases
involved affidavits in which the debt buyer claimed to have personal
knowledge as to the creation of the debt and the accuracy of the amount
owed. 124
Robo-signing is compounded by “sewer service,” a tactic in which the
debt collector intentionally fails to serve notice of the collection suit and then
files a false affidavit of service claiming the defendant has been properly
notified of the pending action. 125 In New York state, the Attorney General’s
office sued multiple debt collectors after an investigation of 100,000 cases
revealed acts of fraudulent service. 126 In some instances, process servers
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HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 61, at 33.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 80, at ii (discussing the many practices in consumer
debt litigation and arbitration that raise consumer protection concerns).
121 TERP & BROWNE, supra note 87, at 4.
122 Id.
123 Spector, supra note 12, at 266–67.
124 Id. at 293–94 (reporting on the results of a study involving 400 cases). Spector further
reports that in 97.22% of cases where affidavits were filed, the affidavit was the only evidence of
the validity of the account. Id. at 294. See also Stifler, supra note 20, at 105 (discussing robosigning as a rampant practice).
125 Stifler, supra note 20, at 107 (defining sewer service as “the practice of intentionally filing
false affidavits of service of process in court”). Like in all civil actions, creditors are required to
provide debtors with proper notice of a lawsuit filed against them prior to obtaining a judgment.
E.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 80, at 8.
126 See Press Release, N.Y. State Attorney Gen., The N.Y. State Attorney General Andrew M.
Cuomo Announces Guilty Plea of Process Server Company Owner Who Denied Thousands of New
Yorkers Their Day in Court (Jan. 15, 2010), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/new-york-stateattorney-general-andrew-m-cuomo-announces-guilty-plea-process-server. For a similar action
filed by private litigants, see Benjamin Mueller, Victims of Debt Collection Scheme in New York
Win $59 Million in Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2mB3Pg8.
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claimed to have been at more than one residence at the exact same time; in
others, claimed attempts to serve court papers would have required the
process server to drive more than 10,000 miles in a single day. 127 Rampant
reports of sewer service exist in other areas of the country as well. 128 In one
California case, a debt collector claimed to have served a defendant
personally in her home when in fact she was hospitalized. 129 In a second
California case, the wife of a debtor was reportedly served at the couple’s
Santa Clara home, even though she had died two years earlier. 130 One study
of process service in New York’s King and Queens Counties found that
personal service was achieved in only six percent of civil debt collection
cases. 131
In theory, judges in small claims courts are liberated from the traditional
adversarial paradigm and authorized to interrogate parties as to the veracity
of their claims. 132 However, these affirmative powers are discretionary and
not required, 133 and in practice, many judges do not seize on the opportunity
to scrutinize the more powerful party’s assertions. 134 Robo-signing and sewer

127 See Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs., 780 F.3d 70, 76–77 (2d Cir. 2015) (discussing a
district court’s findings that there was substantial support for a finding of sewer service based on
these factors); Press Release, N.Y. State Attorney Gen., supra note 126.
128 See U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Debt Collection: Protecting Consumers Roundtable 25–26,
30–33, 58 (Dec. 4, 2009) (discussing incidents and suspicions of sewer service in Connecticut and
Florida).
129 Ctr. for Investigative Reporting, Bay Area Residents Sue Process Servers for Failing to
Deliver
Lawsuits,
SAN
DIEGO
UNION–TRIB.
(May
24,
2012),
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/g00/sdut-bay-area-residents-sue-process-servers-forfailing-2012may24-htmlstory.html.
130 Id.
131 MFY LEGAL SERVS., INC., JUSTICE DISSERVED: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE
EXCEPTIONALLY LOW APPEARANCE RATE BY DEFENDANTS IN LAWSUITS FILED IN THE CIVIL
COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 6 (2008). Reviewing its own case data, MFY reports that of
the 350 individuals assisted with debt collection matters over a twelve-month period, “[i]n nearly
every case” the client first learned of the debt action brought against them “when their bank account
was restrained as a result of a default judgment . . . .” Id. at 11.
132 See Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the
Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2016–18 (1999)
(discussing state small claims court rules allowing judges to relax procedural rules and assist
unrepresented parties).
133 For one example, see the Massachusetts small claims rules, which authorize judges to
“conduct the trial in such order and form and with such methods of proof as it deems best suited to
discover the facts and do justice in the case.” MASS. SMALL CLAIMS R. 7(g) (West 2018). See also
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.520 (West 2017) (providing that small claims judges “may consult
witnesses informally and otherwise investigate the controversy”) (emphasis added); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 55.090 (West 2016) (allowing that the court “may informally consult witnesses or
otherwise investigate the controversy”) (emphasis added).
134 See Austin Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims Court,
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service are not regularly challenged by small claims judges. 135 And in rental
housing cases, which are also commonly litigated in small claims tribunals,
judges do not take action to surface and address the tenant’s right to quality
housing, even though it is an integral component of many eviction actions,
and could potentially lower the amount of the disputed contract rent. 136
Judicial training and habit may explain this sort of capture. The
adversary system acculturates judges to allow parties to control the facts and
issues in a case. When a debt collector or landlord, typically a repeat player
accompanied by a lawyer, puts forward a lawsuit, many judges may simply
hesitate to interfere on behalf of the floundering opponent. 137
Some commentators also note that plain old-fashioned bias, or at least
preferentialism, may be at play. Judges may simply identify more closely
with the powerful actor’s predicament, or side with the party most likely to
benefit a re-election campaign—or, in a rental housing matter, they may even
implicitly reject the notion that substandard housing should excuse rent
payments. 138
In short, these three structural forces—systemic lack of representation,
overcrowded dockets, and corporate capture of small claims tribunals—
place the courts in a position of aggravating, rather than solving, particular
social issues. Through multiple mechanisms, the adjudicatory process
virtually guarantees that landlords and creditors can obtain quick and easy
judgments that further rent and debt collection, while leaving social
problems (and reciprocal rights) such as protection against substandard
housing and consumer fraud unaddressed.

10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 339, 353 (1976) (noting that judges in small claims courts do not often
actively develop facts, despite authorization to do so); Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 115, at
251–53 (detailing judges’ confusion concerning their role in small claims court and explaining that
they did not actively question litigants due to their belief that they must remain and appear neutral).
135 This is evident by the high rate at which judges enter default judgments despite the fact that
research reveals a high percentage of cases involving robo-signing or sewer service that could have
been detected upon judicial examination. See STAUFFER, supra note 17, at 3–4.
136 See Michele Cotton, A Case Study on Access to Justice and How to Improve It, 16 J.L.
SOC’Y 61, 72–74 (2014).
137 See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor
Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 579 (1992) (exploring “the paradigm
of civil disputes, where the judge expects each party to set forth pertinent claims, defenses,
counterclaims, and evidence”).
138 See WILLIAM E. MORRIS INST. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 93, at 10 (observing a friendliness
between judges and landlord attorneys, such that vacation plans were discussed in open court);
Bezdek, supra note 137, at 571–75 (positing that judges’ “world view” and “professional station”
may cause them to discount tenant hardship); Sabbeth, supra note 75, at 78–79 (noting that judicial
bias may favor landlords because judges are more likely to be property owners and discussing how
the law and culture of housing courts has been influenced over time by disproportionate attorney
representation of landlords); Super, supra note 10, at 389, 415–16 (discussing judges’ “symbiotic[,]
cooperative relationships with landlords and their lawyers,” and noting that “[e]lected judges may
have come to expect the support of the landlords’ bar,” making them vulnerable to capture).
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III
A FRAMEWORK FOR CIVIL PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS

This Part develops a theory for adapting the drug court model to the
civil arena. In criminal courts, the heart of the problem-solving model is the
availability of an alternative remedy: treatment over prison. In civil courts,
the remedy itself is not necessarily deficient; the law affords important
protections against substandard housing and unfair debt collection. Instead,
it is access to the remedy that is compromised. This Part will demonstrate
how core drug court principles—an intent to solve a social problem,
interdisciplinary collaboration, and a strong judicial role—can be harnessed
to address the unique process failures in the civil justice system. Specifically,
the drug court framework can be exploited in the civil private law setting to
achieve three process-oriented goals: (1) motivate judges to protect
vulnerable court users, (2) attack information asymmetry, and (3) monitor
liable parties to induce performance.
Relying on extensive field work I conducted in an experimental
Housing Conditions Court (HCC) in the District of Columbia, this Part
highlights the relevance and suitability of the problem-solving philosophy to
attack distinct civil justice problems. Elsewhere, I have evaluated the HCC’s
inquisitorial features and their correlation to substantive justice in the
court. 139 Here, based on court observations in nearly 300 cases and a
longitudinal review of 73 matters, I catalogue the HCC’s problem-solving
characteristics and evaluate the role each might play in mitigating process
distortions in the civil courts. Despite significant differences with the drug
court model, a set of the HCC’s adjudicatory features may be stitched
together to shape an emergent problem-solving model in the private law
sphere.
A.

Motivating Judges to Protect Vulnerable Court Users

Drug courts advance their therapeutic goal by naming the purpose of
the court as solving the social problem of addiction. This naming function
allows judges to apply an alternative remedy to criminal conduct:
compulsory treatment.
An important difference in civil courts is that the existing remedy may
be adequate and not in need of reform. Housing codes, for instance, enshrine
substantial protections against unsafe dwellings, and subject property owners

139 See Steinberg, supra note 17 (finding that the HCC’s “inquisitorial” procedures can lead to
accurate outcomes for tenants and court success).
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to fines, damages, and rent abatements for violations ranging from broken
windows to rodent infestations. 140 A robust collection of consumer
protection laws exist as well and require debt collectors to adhere to rigid
standards when seeking repayment in court. 141
However, the naming function that is so critical to drug courts can be
engineered in the civil setting to achieve a different goal: motivating judges
to protect vulnerable court users.
1. The Existing Judicial Paradigm
Civil courts tend to espouse neutral, proceduralist missions that
emphasize impartial decision making. For instance, a civil court mission
might announce the court’s intention to “protect rights and liberties, uphold
and interpret the law, and resolve disputes peacefully, fairly and
effectively.” 142 While such a pronouncement is hardly controversial, it tends
to reinforce the primacy of a neutral judge who is agnostic as to outcomes.
In tribunals where both parties are adequately represented, a passive judge
might indeed be the ideal. But on the pro se dockets that now dominate the
civil courts, a judge who is not particularly attuned to the rights of vulnerable
parties may inadvertently allow powerful private actors to control the means
and objectives of the forum.
In rental housing and consumer courts, for instance, judges tend to
adopt rent and debt collection as their assigned purpose, and then conform
their conduct to meet the perceived or actual expectations of their role. 143 In
a fascinating case study, Michele Cotton presents judge-to-party dialogue
capturing how, even in a rental housing matter presenting egregious housing
code violations, the judge is intently focused on the amount of rent owed to
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See, e.g., D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 14, §§ 4, 8 (2018).
Creditors are barred from many forms of illegal debt collection in court. These include
prohibitions on the collection of debt that is time-barred (“zombie” debt), is of unknown origin (due
to bundling and re-sale of debt to third party debt buyers), violates state usury laws, violates service
of process laws, or is not owed (“phantom” debt). See STIFLER & PARRISH, supra note 11, at 8–17
(discussing common practices in debt collection litigation and federal and state efforts to regulate
them). Debtors may also raise protections through the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which
governs the manner in which a creditor can pursue debt collection, but does not provide any
defenses to collection actions. Id. at 2; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k) (2012) (establishing a private
right of action against debt collectors who violate the FDCPA, but not providing for defenses in
individual collection lawsuits).
142 JOINT COMM. ON JUDICIAL ADMIN., STRATEGIC PLAN OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COURTS: 2013–2017, at 13 (2013), https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/mattersdocs/Open-to-All-Trusted-by-All-Justice-for-All-Strategic-Plan-of-the-District-of-ColumbiaCourts-2013-2017_internet.pdf.
143 For a discussion of this phenomenon in the debt context, see Healy, supra note 118. See also
Holland, supra note 88, at 183, 185–86 (contending that his empirical data on 4400 consumer cases
confirms the “widespread belief that, in our broken system, small claims courts have become an
extension of the debt collection industry”).
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the landlord—to the exclusion of the tenant’s equally significant housing
quality claims. 144 This judicial orientation is likely the product of the judge’s
reflexive, learned behavior over time in a courtroom where only landlords
wield the expertise and professional assistance to control the issues, facts,
and evidence in each case. In other words, a “neutral” judicial posture that
permits parties to direct case presentation will, in a pro se court, enable the
represented group to undermine the legitimacy of opposing claims, and
ultimately, to define the goals of adjudication for the tribunal at large.
2. “Naming” and Judicial Conduct
The drug court principle of “naming” can be imported into the civil
justice system to encourage a shift in judicial behavior and attitudes. For
instance, a civil problem-solving court might name its purpose as promoting
housing quality, or combatting unlawful debt collection, or preserving
affordable housing. By redefining the objective of adjudication, the civil
problem-solving court would not open the gateway to a new remedy, as
occurs in drug courts; it would instead aim to influence the judges’ behavior,
and in turn, their state of mind. The idea is that, if judges were to view the
purpose of the tribunal as, say, improving substandard housing, they would
approach their work with an eye toward affording tenants the benefit of
existing substantive and procedural protections—thereby serving as a shield
against the dominance of powerful private actors.
The drug court experiment has made plain the connection between
renaming the purpose of the court and consequent judicial behavior in those
forums. In furtherance of the treatment goal, drug court judges abandon their
detached and formal demeanor and work actively with defendants to
overcome addiction. 145 James L. Nolan, Jr., a sociologist who conducted an
ethnographic study of two-dozen drug courts, describes judges who shed
their robe and gavel, hug graduates upon completion of the program, and
generally work to convey a message of “care, concern, and interest” so that
defendants are motivated to stay committed to sobriety. 146 Not without a note
of critique, Nolan chronicles these efforts as part of the “deliberately and
consciously” orchestrated “theater” of the model, in which the judge adopts
a caring persona in order to build trust and produce certain therapeutic
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Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 131–32; Miller, supra note 30, at 423.
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outcomes. 147 However, even if the role is scripted, as Nolan suggests, judges
who have had drug court assignments report a feeling of liberation at being
able to “mak[e] a difference.” 148 Because of the role they are asked to play,
drug court judges are invested in the success of the treatment regimen, 149
rather than resigned to performing a bureaucratic function such as arraigning
200 cases in one day 150 or, in their words, issuing sentences that might as
well have been programmed by a computer.151
If re-naming the goal of adjudication affects judicial behavior—as the
drug court model demonstrates is possible—a cyclical loop also becomes
possible in which behavior affects judicial attitudes. This is the thrust of a
counterintuitive insight from social psychology: “the primacy of behavior on
attitudes.” 152 One might assume the opposite—that attitudes predict
behavior. But behavioral science literature over the past century has
consistently found, to the contrary, “that people’s behavior is often more
predictive of their attitudes than their attitudes are of their behavior.”153
Victor Quintanilla relies on this research to suggest that, if judges are
required to mold their behavior to positively affect socially disadvantaged
users of the courts, their attitudes toward those groups will shift
accordingly. 154 And, indeed, the drug court model may illustrate the potency
of this theory. A survey of 355 judges conducted by Deborah Chase and the
Honorable Peggy Fulton highlights the power of simple behavioral changes
to impact judicial attitudes. 155 In their study, drug court judges were
compared to judges who preside over traditional dockets and evaluated on,
among other factors, their attitudes toward litigants. 156 The drug court judges
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Id. at 72–75.
Id. at 108–10.
149 Nolan discusses the example of a judge approaching a defendant’s employer to help him get
his job back. This kind of judicial conduct has been criticized for overreaching, but also lauded for
offering needed assistance to a defendant beyond the four corners of a case. Id. at 95.
150 See Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 5, at 135.
151 NOLAN, supra note 34, at 105 (quoting a judge who argues against mandatory sentencing
schemes in traditional courts because of their machine-like nature).
152 Victor D. Quintanilla, Human-Centered Civil Justice Design, 121 PA. ST. L. REV. 745, 803
(2017).
153 Id. at 774; see also John T. Cacioppo et al., Rudimentary Determinants of Attitudes II: Arm
Flexion and Extension Have Differential Effects on Attitudes, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 5 (1993); Jesse Chandler & Norbert Schwarz, How Extending Your Middle Finger
Affects Your Perception of Others: Learned Movements Influence Concept Accessibility, 45 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 123 (2009); Gary L. Wells & Richard E. Petty, The Effects of Overt
Head Movements on Persuasion: Compatibility and Incompatibility of Responses, 1 BASIC &
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 219 (1980).
154 Quintanilla, supra note 152, at 789–803 (making recommendations to apply a humancentered civil justice design to the court system).
155 Deborah Chase & Peggy Fulton Hora, The Best Seat in the House: The Court Assignment
and Judicial Satisfaction, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 209 (2009).
156 Id. at 221.
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were significantly “more positive in their attitudes toward the litigants than
the other judges.” 157 Fifty-one percent of drug court judges reported positive
attitudes toward litigants on metrics such as the litigants’ motivation and
ability to address their own problems, while only fifteen percent of judges
on traditional dockets felt the same way. 158 This research suggests that
charging judges with the duty to transform their courtroom conduct may
prompt an attitudinal shift that, cyclically, reinforces the problem-solving
mission of the court.
Applying this theory to the civil justice system, a civil problem-solving
court might exploit the drug court principle of “naming” to immunize judges
against capture by powerful classes of litigants. In the model I envision, a
civil problem-solving court would name its purpose as addressing a social
problem, and judges would then intentionally tailor their courtroom practices
to protect the rights of vulnerable parties. If social psychology proves
prescient, behavioral changes among judges may ultimately spur attitudinal
changes, which would strengthen the capacity of the court to solve the named
social problem. As will be discussed in the next subsection, field work I
conducted in an experimental Housing Conditions Court (HCC) in the
District of Columbia illustrates how these sequential effects might unfold. 159
3. The Naming Function and the HCC
Launched in 2011, the HCC is an experimental calendar housed within
the District of Columbia’s Superior Court system and designed to adjudicate
affirmative habitability claims. 160 Essentially, the HCC has taken
substandard housing claims out of the exclusive domain of the court’s
traditional landlord-tenant division—which is besieged by all of the systemic
conditions described in Part II—and created an alternative venue for tenants
seeking repairs.
The HCC’s specialized docket was created in the wake of a 2008 series
of articles published by the Washington Post that exposed the substandard
condition of local rental housing. 161 The series documented “decrepit and
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dangerous” conditions at properties across the city, and chided the local
enforcement agency, the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs,
for willfully ignoring tenant complaints at the expense of public health and
safety. 162 While the District’s existing landlord-tenant branch is ostensibly
tasked with adjudicating substandard housing issues, it, too, was deemed
ineffective in combating this entrenched social problem. 163
On its face, the HCC, in many ways, resembles a classic informal
tribunal. 164 Formal testimony, the rules of evidence, and most procedural
norms are eschewed by the court. 165 With the exception of service of
process—which the HCC requires—judges enforce very few of the
courtroom formalities typically observed in traditional courts. 166 One might
expect, then, that the HCC would fall victim to the same corporate capture
that other small claims and informal tribunals have experienced. However,
the court has interrupted this cycle with the same rhetorical device employed
by drug courts: naming the court’s purpose as solving an identifiable social
problem.
The Administrative Order that created the HCC named the express and
exclusive mission of the court as solving the social issue of substandard
housing. The Order identified the impetus for the new court as “a need to
quickly address conditions which constitute violations of the District of
Columbia’s housing code . . . .” 167 Regarding the decision to develop the
HCC as a specialized calendar outside the existing court structure, the
Administrative Order reiterated its intent to “expedite actions for
enforcement of housing code regulations.” 168 This targeted emphasis—
focusing on one particular class of litigants whose rights have typically gone

Cohen,
Failure
in
Enforcement],
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/story/2008/03/10/ST2008031003243.html (detailing the failure of the Department of
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs to adequately investigate, prosecute, and enforce decisions
against landlords); Debbie Cenziper & Sarah Cohen, Fund Gives Tenants Little Relief, WASH. POST
(May
4,
2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/story/2008/05/03/ST2008050302298.html (describing how the Department of
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs used its multimillion-dollar repair fund to support a computer
system and repair single-family homes instead of repairing complexes with rampant code
violations); Debbie Cenziper, Little to Show for the Price, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/13/AR2008081303650.html
(explaining how the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs failed to use its multimilliondollar fund to truly help tenants in “squalid conditions”).
162 Cenziper & Cohen, Failure in Enforcement, supra note 161.
163 See id. (detailing how the branch failed to inspect buildings, collect landlord fines and
enforce housing codes).
164 See Steinberg, supra note 17, at 1062.
165 See id. at 1067.
166 Id. at 1067–69.
167 Superior Court of D.C., Administrative Order No. 10-07, Housing Conditions Civil
Calendar 1 (Apr. 28, 2010).
168 Id.
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unaddressed—is quite different from the broader civil court’s neutral
mission to apply and interpret the law.169
The HCC’s naming function had a powerful effect on the court’s early
development. While the authorizing Administrative Order did not establish
the HCC as aligned with any particular philosophy of adjudication, the
founding judge and others began to discuss the court in public forums as
embracing a problem-solving style. 170 The judge who led the court’s initial
efforts held town hall style community meetings promoting the HCC as a
“fix it” court that “gets repairs done.” 171 A veteran tenant advocate echoed
the problem-solving nature of the HCC, saying, “[i]t’s very ‘roll up your
sleeves and get the job done’”—a nod to the court’s focus on finding and
remedying housing code violations. 172
The HCC’s named purpose also appears to have impacted the judicial
approach to case management and dispute resolution. While the HCC does
not have the case volume of many urban landlord-tenant courts it is still
recognizable as a system of mass justice due to several defining features:
Parties wait for up to three hours for their cases to be called, hearings are
held in a particularly public manner, and most case events occupy no more
than eight to ten minutes of the court’s time. 173 Given these characteristics,
one might predict that the HCC depends on hallway settlements to conclude
most or many proceedings. However, the HCC has turned the typical model
of judicial triage on its head: Rather than steering tenants toward quick and
unmonitored agreements, an active judge works to ensure that legitimate
grievances are investigated and addressed—not swept aside by tainted
methods of early case resolution.
HCC cases commence in the same way they do in many traditional civil
justice matters—with an initial hearing before the judge at which the parties
air their complaints. Unlike in a typical housing court, however, the HCC
judge does not automatically urge hallway settlement as a means of
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winnowing their dockets. Instead, the judge presses the landlord to respond
to the tenant’s allegations, and if an admission of liability is not obtained,
orders a housing inspector to investigate the property. By concentrating
judicial resources on fact-gathering rather than early case resolution, pro se
parties receive encouragement to remain engaged in the court process.
Indeed, in my longitudinal review of seventy-three HCC case matters, only
six percent were ultimately resolved by settlement. 174
In the HCC, this change in judicial case management considerably
expands tenant access to available civil remedies. My longitudinal data
revealed that, when claims of housing code violations were investigated,
ninety-seven percent of tenant cases resulted in at least one substantiated
allegation. 175 While a tribunal dominated by out-of-court settlements is likely
to leave valid grievances unaddressed due to the power gap between
landlords and tenants, a judicial focus on surfacing meritorious claims
instead lays the groundwork for the enforcement of appropriate remedies.
One might imagine other areas—principally consumer debt—where a
specialized docket might also redefine its mission to confront a social issue
that has been impervious to traditional adjudication. Anna Carpenter
describes this as a “principles over procedures” approach. 176 The redefined
objective need not involve a new remedy, but could focus squarely on rights
protection for a vulnerable class of litigants. Judges would then adjust their
conduct to meet the expectations of the forum, but with a different-than-usual
beneficiary: the less powerful party. In this way, the core drug court principle
of “naming” might form the first building block of a civil problem-solving
model.
B.

Attacking Information Asymmetry

A second core principle of drug courts is collaboration with
interdisciplinary actors. In a drug court, the judge is the head of the treatment
team, but regularly relies on the expertise of social workers, probation
officers, and addiction specialists to design the treatment plan and motivate
the defendant to stay engaged in the program. 177
In the civil justice system, the borrowed principle of interdisciplinary
collaboration might form the second building block of a private law problemsolving model. While the civil courts do not require specialized expertise in
designing an alternative remedy, a partnership with outside government
174
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actors could prove useful in facilitating access to, and enforcement of,
existing remedies. In particular, incorporating the expertise and investigatory
skills of regulatory actors into civil proceedings can address the information
asymmetry that results from lopsided representation.
1. Information Asymmetry in Traditional Courts.
Systemic lack of counsel, and specifically lopsided representation, is
responsible for many of the poor justice outcomes in the civil courts.
Powerful private actors such as property owners and debt buyers weaponize
procedure to suppress pro se evidence by objecting to their collection or
authentication methods. 178 And these same actors can simultaneously dodge
compliance with legal requirements, such as personal knowledge of the debt
owed, that, if adhered to, would make their claims harder to bring. 179 Pro se
parties lack the power to overcome a represented opponent’s procedural
wrangling in order to propel their case information and arguments in front of
a judge. 180 As a result, judicial decision making in the civil justice system is
often infected by information asymmetry, leading to skewed results. 181
2. Interdisciplinary Collaboration and Information Asymmetry
The drug court principle of interdisciplinary collaboration has great
potential in the civil sphere for overcoming the information asymmetry that
arises from lopsided representation. The HCC, for example, has adopted the
problem-solving tactic of appointing an independent government actor to
conduct fact investigations. As in most civil courts, the majority of cases in
the HCC involve unrepresented parties and just under half involve
asymmetrical representation, with one party represented and the other not. 182
If the HCC mimicked other civil tribunals, the unavailability of counsel
would greatly complicate tenants’ efforts to navigate procedures and present
evidence, ultimately leading to an under-enforcement of rights. Instead, the

178 See Steinberg, supra note 113, at 923–24 (describing an illustrative landlord-tenant case in
which the tenant fails to satisfy the notice and authentication requirements of which she is unaware).
179 See supra notes 120–131 and accompanying text (discussing robo-signing and sewer
service).
180 See supra Section II.B.1.
181 For examples of how some judges make conscious efforts to overcome this information
asymmetry without providing an unfair advantage to pro se litigants, see Carpenter, supra note 176,
at 688–89 (presenting interviews with judges who stated that they selectively excuse formal
procedural rules in order to ensure that pro se litigants are fully heard).
182 Tenants are pro se in seventy percent of HCC matters, and forty-three percent of cases
involve asymmetrical representation. Steinberg, supra note 17, at 1084.
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inspector is deputized as responsible for providing the court with important
and accurate case information, therefore unburdening the pro se party from
the task of doing so.
The HCC’s collaboration model involves a strategic partnership with
the District of Columbia’s Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs,
the governmental body charged with code inspections. 183 A designated city
housing inspector has been assigned to the HCC and is dispatched to inspect
every unit in which a dispute exists over the presence of code violations.184
The inspector is an institutionalized part of the court, and is charged with
reporting back to the judge on the quality of the unit. 185 The inspector may
visit the unit only once, or may visit several times, depending on the
intractability of the party conflict. 186 By providing the judge with information
about the parties’ out-of-court conduct, the inspector remediates the
information asymmetry that so often taints proceedings without counsel.
3. Three Informational Dimensions to the Interdisciplinary Role
As is the case with all HCC procedures, the inspector’s role is not
formalized, or even made known, by written rule. 187 And yet my field
research reveals that HCC inspectors have a breadth and depth to their
position that arguably even exceeds the standing of interdisciplinary actors
in drug courts. Indeed, the inspector appears to occupy three distinct
informational functions in the HCC, which together suggest guiding
principles for the interdisciplinary component of a civil problem-solving
court.
First, the inspector fulfills the adjudicatory function of determining the
merit of the tenant’s claims. Second, the inspector fulfills the regulatory
function of inspecting for law violations not raised by the tenant. And last,
the inspector fulfills the managerial function of facilitating communication
between the relevant system players to advance the enforcement of remedies.
Although the inspector’s role in the HCC evokes the role that probation
officers, social workers, and drug treatment providers play in drug courts, it
is squarely tailored to address the specific process failures that plague the
civil justice system—and is not ordered around implementation of an
alternative remedy, as is the bedrock of interdisciplinary collaboration in
drug courts.
The inspector’s adjudicatory function in the HCC is carried out by
evaluating the merit of the tenant’s claims. Armed with the tenant’s
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complaint, inspectors conduct an initial visit to the premises, investigate the
alleged housing code violations, and convey their findings to the court both
in writing and orally. 188 In this way, a tenant’s claims are either substantiated
or invalidated. This fact-finding role can be enormously beneficial for pro se
tenants, who may be unable to prove a cockroach infestation, for instance,
without the inspector’s observation of physical evidence. 189
As part of the adjudicatory function, inspectors also play a crucial role
in determining mixed questions of law and fact. When a property owner
disputes liability for a broken shower, for example, the inspector makes a
determination as to whether structural conditions or the tenant’s misconduct
is the primary cause for the substandard condition. 190 Interdisciplinary
cooperation is leveraged to dissolve the influence of procedural and
substantive know-how on the outcome of civil matters, and to produce
information that is reliable and relevant to the court’s decision-making.
Turning to the inspector’s regulatory function, this part of the role is
fulfilled by surveilling homes for the presence of code violations the tenant
did not allege. That is, the inspector does not simply operate within the
adversarial framework of the litigation, in which the issues are confined to
those raised by the parties, but instead pursues full compliance with the
housing code. 191 This regulatory role is critical to reducing the role of
information asymmetry in producing unbalanced civil justice outcomes.
Indeed, in my field research, thirty-five percent of defective conditions
addressed by HCC judges were independently discovered by the inspector
and not raised by the tenant. 192 In this way, the inspectors supplant some of
the informational expertise that attorneys traditionally offer: They bring
value to the case, in part, by identifying issues and sources of relief not
previously understood by the client.
Finally, the housing inspector fulfills a managerial function in the HCC.
Cases in the HCC do not conclude upon a finding of liability; instead,
continuous hearings are held until the property owner completes repairs. 193
The inspector’s managerial role focuses on this enforcement period. In
essence, the inspector’s position in the field is utilized to gather information
about conflicts that arise as the parties work to address the judge’s finding of
liability. As illustration, at one HCC hearing, a tenant expressed
188
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dissatisfaction with progress on repairs, and the landlord himself admitted to
uncertainty over the quality of his contractor’s work, noting that he did not
have the expertise to evaluate his contractor’s assurances that repairs were
complete. 194 The inspector visited the unit to determine the adequacy of
repairs, and brought the information back to the judge; following this
inspection, the parties reached agreement over the scope of needed work.
This ongoing managerial function is key to facilitating an exchange of
information among system actors so that judicial directives are fulfilled.
The inspector’s managerial role comes closest to replicating the
function of interdisciplinary actors in drug courts. Probation officers and
treatment professionals meet regularly to review a defendant’s progress in
treatment, and to communicate drug testing results to the judge. The
defendant’s engagement in treatment is closely monitored, and rewards or
sanctions may be doled out depending on nature of the reports from
interdisciplinary collaborators. Similarly, the inspector in the HCC serves as
a liaison to the court on the parties’ activities and allows the judge to calibrate
punitive measures against noncompliant landlords, if appropriate. 195 In the
civil problem-solving setting, however, the inspector’s investigations
contribute critical case information to determinations of liability as well as
enforcement. It is this aspect of their role that does the most to address the
information asymmetry that so often subverts the claims-making process for
pro se parties.
4. Challenges to Interdisciplinary Collaboration
It is important to acknowledge that while interdisciplinary collaboration
is a powerful tool that a developing civil problem-solving court might put to
use in battling the impact of systemic lack of counsel on justice outcomes,
the role is rife with complications and challenges that must be considered.
Most significantly, an inspector’s competence and neutrality is central to the
effective undertaking of the role. The court and the parties must trust that the
inspector is thorough in examining the unit, objective in identifying
violations and assigning blame, and balanced in negotiating interparty
conflict. 196 In addition, the inspector’s role can become so dominant as to
usurp judicial power and undermine party autonomy. This latter concern may
threaten an independent judiciary, and would be particularly worrisome
where the interdisciplinary actor is not considered impartial.197
194
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The evolving distrust of guardians ad litem (GALs) in family courts is
evidence of the perils that can accompany an independent investigator’s role.
The GAL model in family courts involves the appointment of a third-party
actor who conducts investigations into the “best interests of the child.” 198 The
results of the GAL’s investigation are then communicated to the judge to
inform the court’s ultimate decisions on custody, visitation, and mandated
mental health or substance abuse treatment. 199 When the model rose to
prominence in the 1970s, it was seen as a significant safeguard for the best
interests of children. 200 Now, the model is often harshly critiqued, with
concerns raised over GAL’s broad investigatory powers, minimal training,
invasion into family privacy, and selective reporting of child abuse.201
Without mechanisms to ensure accountability and impartiality, the role of an
independent inspector may at best be ineffective, and at worst corrupted.
Challenges like those that now accompany the GAL role must be
recognized, and were an inspector’s role to be scaled as part of a broadly
adopted civil problem-solving framework, may even prove unavoidable.
However, the interdisciplinary model also offers unrealized promise in
dissolving the information asymmetry that results from the clash of
procedural complexity and systemic lack of counsel in the civil justice
system. The inspector assigned to the HCC during the study period was lifted
from a local code agency widely criticized for incompetence and even
corruption, 202 and yet has been praised for excellence and trustworthiness in
her work with the court. 203 This suggests that a court’s organizational
dynamics may play a significant role in creating and preserving an effective
interdisciplinary partnership. To avoid reinforcing existing power
relationship between judges and interdisciplinary actors in criminal problem-solving courts devoted
to mental health.
198 Roy T. Stuckey, Guardians Ad Litem as Surrogate Parents: Implications for Role
Definition and Confidentiality, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1788–89 (1996).
199 Id.
200 See Brian G. Fraser, Independent Representation for the Abused and Neglected Child: The
Guardian Ad Litem, 13 CAL. W. L. REV. 16, 25–28 (1976).
201 See Mary Grams, Note, Guardians Ad Litem and the Cycle of Domestic Violence: How the
Recommendations Turn, 22 LAW & INEQ. 105, 105–06 (2002).
202 Cenziper & Cohen, Failure in Enforcement, supra note 161 (reporting that the District
agency “entrusted with protecting tenants has routinely overlooked decrepit and dangerous
conditions”); Cenziper, supra note 161 (reporting that the District’s code enforcement agency has
struggled to account for millions of dollars that were supposed to be spent on rehabilitating
dilapidated properties).
203 See Performance Oversight Hearing on the Department of Consumer and Regulatory
Affairs: Hearing Before the Comm. on Bus., Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, Council of the District
of Columbia (2015) (written testimony of Beth Mellen Harrison, Supervising Attorney, Housing
Unit, Legal Aid Society of the District of Columbia).
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hierarchies, judicial appraisal of the interdisciplinary actor’s neutrality and
competence must be carefully carried out.
5. Interdisciplinary Collaboration in Consumer Debt Cases
Interdisciplinary collaboration in the consumer debt setting cannot
mimic the HCC’s model since there is no obvious local agency available to
conduct on-the-ground investigations in this sphere. However, the 2010
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which
created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and broadened
oversight of the debt collection industry, creates a fresh opportunity to
contemplate data sharing as the interdisciplinary mechanism for targeting
illegal debt collection practices within a problem-solving framework. 204
Since its inception in 2010, the CFPB has amassed national data on
unscrupulous debt collectors and made use of its authority to prosecute
unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices. For example, in 2013, the CFPB
successfully sued Cash America, one of the largest payday lenders in the
United States, for various collection abuses, including the robo-signing of
court documents. The lawsuit resulted in a $14 million refund to the affected
consumers. 205 In addition, in 2015, the CFPB filed suit against two
companies that bought improperly vetted personal data from loan
applications and then re-sold the data to fraudulent third-party debt buyers,
thus subjecting millions of consumers to unlawful collection. 206
While the CFPB has no involvement in individual collection actions, its
data could be enormously beneficial to problem-solving judges. To shape its
enforcement priorities, the CFPB maintains a “complaint database,” a
sizeable and organized information repository that invites consumers to
report on their challenges in the marketplace. 207 Currently, the CFPB’s
existing data is not shared through any formal mechanism with local courts
and judges. Similarly, local courts do little to share with the CFPB the
egregious collection practices they encounter on a regular basis. An

204 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
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informational feedback loop between local judges and the CFPB could
effectively serve as the interdisciplinary collaboration prong of a consumer
problem-solving court.
A snapshot of the CFPB’s database reveals a high volume of complaints
that mirror many of the issues arising in everyday litigation. For instance, the
December 2016 monthly complaint report reveals that thirty-nine percent of
complaints submitted about debt collection have to do with “phantom debt,”
or debt the consumers allege is not owed.208 In addition, the database tracks
which debt buyers top the average monthly complaint list. 209 These statistics
could inform the local courts which cases are appropriate for problemsolving scrutiny in the form of increased judicial monitoring.
At its best, a consumer problem-solving model would build reciprocal
communication channels between courts and the CFPB, so that not only are
judges apprised of the activities of known law-breakers, but the CFPB can
expand its data collection to include case information from the courts. A
formalized informational feedback loop would encourage judges to
contribute case data to the CFPB’s information repository. Local case data
would expand the volume of reliable information maintained by the CFPB—
currently limited to consumer complaints—which would then concomitantly
grow the data accessible to other judges.
The interdisciplinary model proposed, premised on the exchange of
data, and especially if coupled with curated information analysis and
presentation from both sides, could greatly assist the courts in attacking
information asymmetry. While consumers are often unaware of a debt
collector’s national practices, judges attuned to such trends might use data to
make informed decisions about when to impose a demand for more evidence
or require additional court monitoring. A “big data” approach to judicial
information gathering may not be as finely tuned as case-specific fact
investigation, but certainly could advance more vigorous scrutiny of habitual
bad actors. The consumer example demonstrates the elasticity of problemsolving methods and the flexibility of the model to adapt its core components
to a variety of existing circumstances and actors.
C.

Motivating Liable Parties to Perform

A strong and central judicial role is the third element of a drug court.
As Greg Berman and John Feinblatt have written, drug courts “make
aggressive use of a largely untapped resource: the power of judges to
208
209
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promote compliance with court orders.” 210
In civil justice matters, this essential principle might form the final
building block of a problem-solving court. Much like in drug courts, a civil
problem-solving judge would be placed at the center of dispute resolution.
Through the exercise of both formal and informal authority, this reimagined
judge would leverage the findings of the interdisciplinary actor to actively
promote the enforcement of existing civil remedies. The problem-solving
judging task evokes a small-scale version of structural reform litigation in
which performance is eked out over a long stretch of time through an arduous
process of setting modest benchmarks and then relying on the judge’s
authority to hold the parties accountable for progress.
1. Judicial Monitoring and Forms of Authority
If a civil problem-solving model is different from its criminal
counterpart in its engagement with liability, it closely mirrors the drug court
example in its monitoring function. In the HCC, upon the inspector’s
discovery of defective housing conditions, judges schedule hearings at twoto three-week intervals to monitor the property owner’s repairs. 211 This
monitoring role takes a simple yet consistent form: Following a report on the
status of repairs, the judge engages the parties in dialogue, surfaces barriers
to enforcement, and stakes out specific obligations that the parties must
fulfill at both interim and long-term deadlines. 212
In one characteristic illustration, the tenant and property owner bickered
in court over the proper way to repair a broken window. 213 The judge ordered
the landlord to hire a window contractor within four days, have a plan for
repairs in two and a half weeks, and clearly communicate that plan to the
tenant. 214 To be sure, the tenant’s conduct may be the target of judicial
enforcement efforts as well. Where a landlord complained that a tenant had
obstructed access to the property on the scheduled day for repairs, the judge
issued a directive instructing the tenant to vacate certain rooms in the unit at
particular times. 215 In my longitudinal study of the HCC’s substantive
outcomes, nearly eighty percent of substantiated violations were ultimately
repaired, lending credibility to the theory that judicial monitoring can
motivate liable parties to perform legal obligations that have traditionally
gone under-enforced. 216
In the consumer setting, a judicial monitoring regime could be informed
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by the CFPB’s national data and imposed against collectors with a reported
history of unfair or deceptive practices. One might imagine a judge requiring
suspect debt collectors to appear in court and provide reliable evidence to
support the legitimacy of their collection efforts. Such monitoring would
eliminate rushed default judgments and force creditors to face early judicial
interrogation on the veracity of their claims. The critical nature of judicial
engagement in pre-hearing proceedings is supported by Colleen Shanahan’s
research, which demonstrates that “access-friendly” judges—who strive to
reach substantive decisions and avoid defaults—produce more favorable
outcomes for vulnerable litigants. 217
While some exercise of formal judicial authority is required to manage
power imbalances and motivate party performance, the drug court example
demonstrates that charismatic authority is also a critical element of a
problem-solving judging model. Formal authority bestows on the judge the
convening power to hold continuous hearings, and provides the judge with a
set of sticks that can be used to punish a noncompliant party. 218 For instance,
HCC judges may schedule additional enforcement hearings or impose
sanctions where the conduct of property owners is particularly egregious. A
problem-solving judge may be reluctant to rely too heavily on the exercise
of formal authority, however, as a heavy-handed approach may undermine
the cooperative spirit of the enterprise. This is certainly true in drug courts,
where judges often hold back on imposing punishments, such as jail time,
even when a defendant underperforms in treatment. 219
Underpinning the use of formal authority, then, is the judge’s effective
exercise of charismatic authority. Coined by Max Weber, charismatic
authority is not derived from law or tradition, but rather from the force of the
judge’s character or personality. 220 Drug court judges are known to exhibit
tremendous charismatic authority, often using plainspoken language and
expressive gestures to develop a relationship with defendants that, they hope,
217 In Shanahan’s study, conducted with her research team, she found that unemployment
insurance claimants were more likely to achieve a favorable outcome when judges were “accessfriendly,” as she terms it. Colleen F. Shanahan, The Keys to the Kingdom: Judges, Pre-Hearing
Procedure, and Access to Justice, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 215, 233, 242–43 (2018). In Shanahan’s study,
access-friendliness was measured by the likelihood that a judge would grant a claimant’s request
for a continuance. Id. at 239–40. Shanahan’s findings support the notion that judicial action in prehearing processes is critical to reaching merits-based substantive decisions and protecting
vulnerable court users. Id. at 243.
218 See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875,
945–46 (2003).
219 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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will later translate to completion of the treatment regimen. HCC judges
demonstrate the potential of charismatic authority in the civil justice sphere
by engaging the parties in similar blunt-but-respectful dialogue about their
actions. Like in drug courts, HCC judges adopt a folksy persona and largely
choose to speak directly to parties, even when lawyers are present. 221
Timothy Casey argues that the charismatic authority so essential to the
problem-solving judging model makes for an “inherently unstable” regime,
as a tribunal relying on an extraordinary and dedicated judge will last “only
as long as the life or reign of the individual leader.” 222 However, charismatic
authority does not have to manifest itself in theatrical gestures or heroic
individuals; it can emerge in subtler ways and nonetheless be influential.
For instance, HCC judges forge a more intimate connection with the
parties by maintaining their accessibility outside the courtroom. A judge may
say to a tenant, “Here is my number in chambers. Call me directly if the
landlord does not show up.” 223 The judges also go to great lengths to
accommodate parties who face barriers to case participation. At one hearing,
the judge announced in open court that the landlord had just given birth and
would therefore be conferenced into the proceeding on speaker phone. 224
Even when parties fail to appear for hearings without notifying the court in
advance, the HCC judge typically picks up the phone and attempts to include
the missing litigant in the hearing. 225 These gestures are small, but a flexible
judicial style is an embodiment of charismatic authority, and it may later
influence parties to heed the judge’s directives. 226
2. Challenges and Opportunities with Judicial Monitoring
A challenge of the problem-solving judging style is striking the right
balance of formal and charismatic authority. Overuse of sanctions may lead
to backlash against the model, with parties less inclined to participate in the
continuous enforcement hearings. Indeed, fourteen percent of property
owners in my longitudinal review of HCC cases disappeared from the
process without making repairs, revealing that paper sanctions may actually
expel a party from the court’s orbit. 227 At the same time, an under-reliance
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on formal authority may result in enforcement efforts that are slow and
plodding, with the court’s convening power not robust enough to compel
performance. In one HCC matter on its eighth hearing, I observed a judge
reprimanding the landlord for her lackadaisical approach to making
repairs—and yet sanctions were still not imposed. 228
Compounding the difficulty of striking the right balance is that first
generation drug court judges are known to bring an enthusiasm and energy
to the role that future judges may not always match. 229 Therefore, like in any
organizational setting, training, management, and incentives are likely to be
critical components of problem-solving judging. Drug courts, for example,
employ regular evaluation and peer review to encourage positive judicial
performance. 230 These are measures that a civil problem-solving court might
do well to consider in developing an effective and exportable judging model.
Despite the inherent challenges, problem-solving experimentation has
the potential to ignite much-needed innovation in the judicial role, a benefit
that may accrue to other sectors of the civil justice system. Traditional
conceptions of the role of the judge have been slow to evolve through
common law or ethical canons. 231 The duty to remain impartial remains
largely equated with passive judicial conduct. 232 Problem-solving courts
function as sites of experimentation where judges can play an active role,
collaborate with non-court actors, and seek fair outcomes. Indeed, the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct allows for the regulation of problem-solving
judges through specialized local court rules, exempting them from some of
the confining strictures of traditional judging and enabling an active judicial
role as part of a problem-solving process. 233 If adopted in the civil courts, the
problem-solving framework could have reverberating effects throughout the
judiciary by piloting new models of judging that ultimately can be
implemented more broadly. 234
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IV
RESPONDING TO CRITIQUES OF CRIMINAL PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS

Having made the case that a civil problem-solving theory has the
capacity to address some of the unique and pervasive structural failings
present in the civil justice system, this Part responds to some of the common
critiques of drug courts and considers whether the same critiques might apply
in the civil setting. I conclude that private law problem-solving courts may
sidestep many of the pitfalls of the drug court model.
First, a civil problem-solving court does not engage in
“responsibilization,” in which the onus is on a disadvantaged individual to
modify his behavior rather than on the government to improve inequality.
Second, a civil problem-solving model avoids “net widening,” or overenforcement of the targeted behavior, as no alternative remedy is imposed
against the offending actor. And finally, the prospect of diminished
procedural protections—a significant concern in drug courts—is less
troublesome in the civil justice context since parties are afforded few
constitutional rights in need of protection and there are hardly any lawyers
to enforce them.
A.

Responsibilization

Some commentators object to drug courts as embracing a
“responsibilization” strategy. 235 These commentators find it troubling that
the drug court model holds the defendant accountable for treating his
addiction while letting the government off the hook for failing to provide
adequate access to education, job training, housing and health care in the first
instance. 236 On this critique, the defendant’s addiction is viewed as the
product of societal failings and compulsory treatment is simply one more
measure that puts undue pressure on the individual to fix his own problems,
despite forces out of his control that may make this difficult. 237 Victoria
Malkin argues that, in this way, drug courts are reformulating the social
contract between the state and certain citizens. In her words, “[t]he state and
social responsibility is now replaced with empowerment talk . . . individual
responsibility and participation.” 238 Eric Miller argues that the treatment
regimen is less aimed at promoting good health and more aimed at regulating
235 See Miller, supra note 30, at 425–27; see also DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 124 (2001); Victoria Malkin,
The End of Welfare as We Know It: What Happens When the Judge Is in Charge, 25 CRITIQUE OF
ANTHROPOLOGY 361, 367–68, 382–84 (2005).
236 See GARLAND, supra note 235, at 124; Malkin, supra note 235, at 368; Miller, supra note
30, at 425–27.
237 GARLAND, supra note 235, at 118, 124; Malkin, supra note 235, at 379; Miller, supra note
30, at 425–27.
238 Malkin, supra note 235, at 368.
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the defendant’s conduct. He asserts that drug court judges are not managing
medical opportunities, but are rather promoting discipline-as-treatment. 239
For these commentators, the responsibilization paradigm is paternalistic
and morally bankrupt. They believe addiction services, in addition to other
government benefits, should be offered outside the judicial system and
without the accompanying threat of punishment. Instead, drug court judges
go to great lengths to coerce treatment and mold the defendant’s conduct to
conform to particular social norms. Richard Boldt criticizes problem-solving
courts as a paternalistic form of social control, highlighting frequent urine
testing, parenting classes, and detailed reporting to the court as “potentially
more invasive and coercive than a traditional sentence of incarceration.” 240
James Nolan depicts drug court judges as regularly engaged in “extraadjudicative activism” to promote treatment goals, including meddling in a
defendant’s work and personal life, and employing “tough love” measures
such as brief jail stints 241—all in an effort to induce a defendant to
“voluntarily” engage in the treatment program.
The responsibilization critique is a valid one and situates drug courts
within a larger movement to attach onerous conditions to antipoverty
programs. As the most prominent example, welfare recipients do not
automatically receive benefits based on need, but must earn those benefits
through work and job training contributions. 242 Welfare reform has been
heavily critiqued as adding to the burden of poverty and complicating access
to government services, and similar notes are rung in the compulsory
treatment model. 243
Further legitimizing the responsibilization critique is the contention that
the drug courts’ strong-arm tactics work at cross purposes to successful
treatment. Policy experts point out that drug courts are premised on two
contradictory theories: the “disease model,” which understands that addicts
are compulsive and use drugs despite negative consequences; and the
239
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“rational actor” model, which presumes that a defendant can overcome
addiction if faced with sufficiently negative consequences. 244 The Drug
Policy Alliance argues that these “dueling models” are ineffective because
they “result in people being ‘treated’ through a medical lens while the
symptoms of their condition—chiefly, the inability to maintain abstinence—
are addressed through a penal one.” 245 Some social science research also
disputes the notion that drug treatment can be successful if performed under
duress, 246 which adds additional heft to the argument that responsibilization
is an unproductive strategy.
The civil problem-solving theory I propose not only sidesteps the
responsibilization critique but directly responds to it. Instead of subjecting
the disadvantaged individual to intrusive governmental monitoring and
behavior modification, the HCC places the onus on the more powerful
private party to come into compliance with the law. On the civil model, lowincome parties gain access to much-needed government services, such as
housing inspections, that are virtually inaccessible without the court’s
facilitation. 247 There are no contingencies attached to the receipt of
government benefits within the civil problem-solving framework, and no
system of carrots and sticks to ensure that services are utilized in a particular
manner. While drug courts chase treatment goals by foisting enormous
responsibility on individuals to regulate their own behavior, their civil
counterparts relieve vulnerable parties from the personal persistence that
would otherwise be necessary to goad regulatory and private actors into
meeting their legal obligations.
B.

Net Widening

Another major critique of the drug court model is that it can result in
net widening, or an unintended increase in criminal justice system
involvement. 248 This net widening may occur if drug courts result in more
overall prosecution of low-level crimes, and may also occur if drug courts
result in more jail time than defendants would have received by virtue of
traditional prosecution. 249
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Adriaan Lanni discusses the potential for net widening of prosecutions,
noting that drug courts generally address low-level, quality-of-life offenses
that were previously left unprosecuted. 250 The concern, shared by others, is
that minor crimes may be prosecuted instead of ignored if local law
enforcement begins to view the judicial system—rather than social services
agencies—as integral to the therapeutic process. 251 As one concrete example
of a drug court ensnaring a much wider population than perhaps originally
intended, one judge in Colorado contends that the number of drug cases in
Denver nearly tripled two years after the implementation of its drug court. 252
Drug courts can also result in net widening if the penalty for
unsuccessful treatment outstrips the punishment the defendant would have
faced in a traditional court. The Drug Policy Alliance claims, for instance,
that “people who do not complete drug court may actually face longer
sentences—up to two to five times longer, according to one study—than if
they had been conventionally sentenced in the first place.” 253 Although
admittedly an outlier, NPR’s This American Life ran a two-part story on
Lindsey Dills, a seventeen-year-old first-time offender who was diverted to
drug court after forging two checks totaling one hundred dollars. 254 Due to
failed drug tests during treatment, she served multiple jail stints, at least one
of them in solitary confinement for ninety days. 255 Local criminal defense
attorneys confirmed that, in the traditional criminal justice system, she would
have likely been sentenced to probation, at most. 256
In some respects, the phenomenon of net widening may be present in a
private law problem-solving model as well. Certainly, a court such as the
HCC expands enforcement of the housing code. However, context is critical
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in considering whether net widening is harmful or beneficial to a system of
justice. The criminal justice system is already expansive and
disproportionately brings to bear the state’s greatest power on low-income
communities of color. Any alternative program or court that broadens the
reach of the criminal justice system should therefore be viewed with
suspicion and implemented with the utmost care.
A civil problem-solving court, by contrast, would not exacerbate the
negative impact of state power on already overburdened groups. Instead, it
uses government resources to prevent powerful private parties from
exercising unchecked power over the lives of vulnerable individuals. As
Kathryn Sabbeth has argued persuasively, the danger that private parties
pose to low-income communities is often discounted, when in fact, it can be
as corrosive as the abuse of state power. 257 Through their actions, property
owners and debt collectors can destabilize a family’s shelter, wreck financial
security, and limit future housing and employment opportunities. 258 The civil
justice system has fared poorly in curtailing the power of private actors, and
a problem-solving framework offers one way of leveling the playing field.
Net widening in a drug court is especially suspect because both the
defined “problem” (addiction) and the “remedy” (treatment) involve
controversial moralizing that may unjustly punish the very population it aims
to protect. In the civil setting, the problem and the remedy are already
recognized by law, which helps insulate the model from the net-widening
critique. The HCC, for instance, targets offending individuals and conduct
within the bounds of existing law. While drug courts insist on a standard of
conduct not otherwise required by law—coerced sobriety—the HCC stays
squarely within the lines drawn by legislatures and courts, exacting no
extralegal price from property owners for their bad faith conduct. The HCC
fills a process void, but does not expand the substantive power of tenants or
reduce the agency of landlords.
C.

Fewer Procedural Protections and Diminished Role for Counsel

A third and final critique of the drug court model is that it results in
fewer procedural protections for defendants and a diminished role for
counsel. Critics point first and foremost to the erosion of constitutional rights
for defendants who enroll in drug courts. Defendants generally must waive
their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures
and their Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial and to cross-examine
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adversaries, to name just a few of the lost procedural protections.259 In
addition, because of the “treatment team” approach, defense counsel must
cooperate with the prosecutor and the judge instead of serving as a protective
shield for clients. 260
Compounding the lack of procedural protections in drug courts is vast
judicial discretion in ordering the proceedings. Even supporters of the drug
court model acknowledge that it places “judges with extraordinary power in
a position where they act in what they perceive to be defendants’/clients’
therapeutic interests but with unchecked, potentially punitive effects,
unimpeded by principles of proportionality characteristic of a retributive
theory of punishment.” 261 Others raise concerns that the model is particularly
worrisome because “the defendant is encouraged to waive various rights and
disclose criminal conduct to the judge as a condition of treatment.” 262
In traditional criminal proceedings, counsel’s role is (theoretically)
robust and intended to safeguard important procedural rights. Indeed,
counsel’s main objective is to hold the prosecution to its burden and assist
the defendant in avoiding self-incrimination. In drug courts, however,
defense attorneys are coopted by the treatment team and expected to share
information about their clients’ progress and setbacks. 263 At hearings, judges
communicate directly with defendants and reject the filtering effect of
counsel. 264 Some advocates have concluded that counsel’s role in the drug
court setting serves more to assist the court in its enforcement efforts than to
protect the defendant from state overreach.265
Mae Quinn details a number of legal and ethical issues that can arise for
public defenders practicing in drug court. From a realist perspective, she
contends that the theoretical “team-based” approach does not exist in
practice. 266 Instead, the prosecutor has exclusive control over who is
admitted to the court, who gets treatment, and who graduates. 267 Prosecutors
can dump weak cases in drug court, knowing that defendants cannot avail
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themselves of procedural protections in that setting, and such a strategy is
difficult for defense attorneys to counter. 268 While cooperation among
treatment professionals might be a utopian goal, Quinn suggests that
counsel’s diminished role in drug courts only ends up concentrating the
prosecutor’s power.
While a civil problem-solving model may involve similar dynamics, in
which procedural protections are few and an attorney does not play a
substantial role in mitigating the power and discretion of the judge, the key
difference lies in considering the traditional regime that serves as the
alternative. In civil cases, constitutional protections are sparse and
procedural rules often do not protect individuals involved in low-value massjustice matters. For example, many landlord-tenant and debt collection
courts do not permit jury trials or discovery, or permit waivers of the right to
a jury trial. 269 In addition, even where procedural protections exist, there are
hardly any lawyers available to assert them. Therefore, a problem-solving
framework, where procedures are expressly waived in favor of a strong,
active judge, does less to compromise due process in the civil realm simply
because litigants in that setting start out with less to lose. While the existing
procedural protections in civil courts may not constitute our ideal
benchmarks, they must be taken into account when crafting alternatives. As
Deborah Rhode has continually exhorted, when we consider the efficacy of
any new civil access to justice intervention, we must always ask, “compared
to what?” 270
CONCLUSION

For at least a generation, there has been a deepening awareness of
structural deficiencies in the civil justice system that undermine the courts’
ability to address major social problems. These structural forces—systemic
lack of representation, high-volume dockets, and the corporate capture of
small claims tribunals—often place the courts in a position of aggravating,
rather than solving, particular social problems for defined classes of litigants.
In the criminal setting, drug courts have responded to assembly-line
justice by creating alternative forums in which the goal is treatment and the
judicial role is refashioned as a tool for positive social outcomes. As the
District of Columbia’s experimental Housing Conditions Court represents,
problem-solving methods may be currently underutilized in the civil law
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sphere. By naming the court’s purpose as resolving a social problem,
employing other governmental actors to assist in investigation, and
expanding the judicial role to include a monitoring function, the HCC
addresses some of the unique structural issues in the civil courts and
roadmaps a civil problem-solving model that can be employed in other areas.
The adoption of problem-solving methods in the commonly adjudicated
civil matters of rental housing and consumer debt would target law-breaking
private actors for governmental monitoring, rather than further subjecting
low-income individuals to behavioral modification, as drug courts do.
Moreover, many of the advocacy critiques lodged against drug courts may
be sidestepped by the civil version since fewer procedural entitlements are
available to litigants who use the traditional civil justice system, and hardly
any lawyers are available to enforce those that exist.
There is an argument to be made that the problem-solving model simply
replicates agency function under the aegis of the court. 271 Perhaps courts
should not be charged with resolving complex social problems, and a
legislative fix that creates the ideal institutions with the appropriate funding,
authority, and incentives to do their jobs would be a better solution. 272
Although not impervious to such critique, the civil problem-solving model
offers a window into the possibilities of employing drug court principles to
mitigate the structural conditions that reliably position vulnerable parties on
the losing side of private law litigation. If the civil courts are, as they have
become, sites of last-resort for resolving pressing social issues, a model that
empowers judges to name and tackle the problems they encounter,
coordinate fact-finding with interdisciplinary partners, and use their
authority to monitor bad-faith actors, must invite serious consideration.
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